



Unjust Enrichment Unjustly Ignored:  
Opportunities and Pitfalls in Bringing Unjust Enrichment 
Claims Under ICSID 
 
ABSTRACT. The article seeks to find a space for unjust enrichment in international 
investment dispute resolution and to demonstrate the ways in which international 
arbitrators’ sloppiness in applying unjust enrichment begets undesirable results. The 
article reviews the role of unjust enrichment in international investment disputes, first 
historical and then hypothetical.  By examining historical arbitrations, the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, international and national parameters for unjust enrichment, and 
reinterpreting influential decisions like Chorzow and ADC v. Hungary the article 
demonstrates a long history of reliance on unjust enrichment.  Consistent reliance 
supports the idea that unjust enrichment is a general principle of international law.    
General principles of international law are protected by bilateral investment treaties’ 
fair and equitable treatment standard.  Thus unjust enrichment claims fall under the 
fair and equitable treatment standard in bilateral investment treaties.  Unjust 
enrichment claims also surmount ICSID’s substantial jurisdictional barriers, and may 
prove pivotal in international investment cases involving intellectual property 
disputes.  Along the way, the article attempts develop tenets for unjust enrichment 
that lend themselves to consistent application and hence facilitate the process of fair 
decision-making.   
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Most scholars, arbitrators, and international lawyers, if pushed, would not be 
able to answer a simple question: “Does unjust enrichment play a role in the 
International Centre for Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)?” In this Article I seek both 
to answer the question and to outline a future role for unjust enrichment in ICSID. 
The Article reviews the role of unjust enrichment in international law, first historical 
and then hypothetical. I conclude that unjust enrichment is prohibited, and thus a 
cause of action, under the fair and equitable treatment standard in bilateral investment 
treaties, owing to its reexamined use in cases like Chorzow and ADC v. Hungary.  I 
then show that if unjust enrichment is a cause of action, it may prove instrumental in 
cases involving intellectual property disputes.  
Unexpectedly, my examination of current international law revealed a pattern 
of lawyers and tribunals treating unjust enrichment with evasive reliance and 
carelessness. The pattern appears self-perpetuating, as international lawyers 
undermined unjust enrichment standards by using it indiscriminately, which in turn 
ensured that tribunals viewed the concept as a weak ploy, long depreciated by casual 
use.   I aim to show that despite this degradation, unjust enrichment remains a useful 
tool if used precisely and sparingly.  Indeed, it is so useful that tribunals like that of 
ADC v. Hungary employ it, even if they call it something else. As well, it would seem 
that eliciting behavior by cementing expectations and awarding just remedies requires 
consistent and precise application of legal concepts, and that the sloppy use of unjust 
enrichment degrades both the concept itself and related ideas that misappropriate the 
idea to fill a legal lacunae.  This applies particularly to international investments, 
which engender high levels of interdependence and reliance. Thus, disciplined unjust 
enrichment claims would be a useful part of international investment tribunals’ “fair 
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and equitable treatment standard” toolkit.  In the end, I seek to convince the reader 
that if applied with precision, unjust enrichment may be used as an effective cause of 
action and remedial measure in ICSID disputes.  
 Each piece of my argument requires extended independent exploration.  
Ideally, connecting the disparate elements of my argument at the beginning will 
facilitate better understanding throughout the Article, so I open by sketching my 
argument. In sum, my argument is as follows. Unjust enrichment can easily be 
categorized as a general principle of law under Article 38(I)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention.  Looked at en mass, the use of unjust enrichment in international 
arbitration decisions including Lena Goldfields, The Chorzów Factory Case, and ADC 
v. Hungary establishes its pride of place as a general principle of customary 
international law.  Establishing unjust enrichment as a legal principle included in the 
corpus of customary international law provides claimants protection from unjust 
enrichment under bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”).  This protection manifests as 
follows.  BITs house a limited number of protections, all of which are agreed upon 
before signing.  These protections include, among others: compensation for 
expropriation, and fair and equitable treatment requirements. Fair and equitable 
treatment is a catchall, requiring, at a minimum, that a signatory State not violate 
principles of customary international law with respect to investors from another 
signatory State.  If I show that unjust enrichment is a principle of customary 
international law, then, unjust enrichment falls under the umbrella protection of the 
fair and equitable treatment clause contained in most BITs.   
The next part of the argument proceeds as follows.  To avoid abuse, and 
owing to the idiosyncratic nature of unjust enrichment, unjust enrichment’s intrinsic 
restrictions must influence the way in which a claimant brings an unjust enrichment 
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claim under the fair and equitable treatment clause and the subsequent remedy.  One 
should think of the fair and equitable treatment clause as housing an unjust 
enrichment claim.  Thus, an unjust enrichment claim would need to be proved on its 
own merits.  Once the tribunal determines that there is reasonable belief that an unjust 
enrichment occurred, the claim would satisfy a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.  This two-tiered structure is required in large part because unjust 
enrichment is based purely on what the defendant gained, so both the analysis and the 
remedy are distinct from other causes of action.  This dovetails with the need to 
discipline the application of unjust enrichment. 
  In addition to qualifying as part of the fair and equitable treatment standard’s 
menu of protected rights, unjust enrichment is able to surmount the significant 
jurisdictional barriers ICSID presents. Hence, it is a valid claim under ICSID. Lastly, 
since unjust enrichment claims generally allow only one remedy—restitution—
restitution should be the only remedy available to successful unjust enrichment claims 
brought under the fair and equitable treatment clause, even if the treaty allows for 
other remedies.  
Overall, I begin my argument with basic definitions and build slowly 
thereupon.   Broadly speaking, Section II: History, explores unjust enrichment 
parameters, sets out an international standard, and introduces past cases.  Part A 
defines unjust enrichment and sets out universal parameters stemming from the Iran-
US Claims tribunal and domestic legal codes.  In Part B, I review unjust enrichment’s 
treatment in international law. First, I demonstrate that preventing unjust enrichment 
is a general principle of law.  From there, by surveying cases and scholars, I seek to 
show that unjust enrichment is not only a general principle of law, but also a principle 
of customary international law. The international law survey opens with the history of 
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unjust enrichment in international claims tribunals, focusing on the Chorzów Factory 
Case in Section B.2 and ADC v. Hungary in Section B.3.   I attempt to demonstrate 
that the oft-cited Chorzów Factory1 case offers unjust enrichment as a remedy and 
that some cases citing it rely on unspoken ideas of unjust enrichment, particularly 
ADC v. Hungary.2 In Section B.4 I briefly examine unjust enrichment language in 
ICSID cases— to assess the current role unjust enrichment plays in ICSID decision-
making. I move on to Section B.5, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which provides 
guidance on applying unjust enrichment internationally. 
  In Section III: Hypothetical, I use a sweep of hypotheticals based on the 
Mihaly v. Sri Lanka3 fact pattern to explore jurisdictional thresholds, merits-based 
limitations, and general boundaries for a future claimant bringing an unjust 
enrichment claim under ICSID.   
 
II. HISTORY 
A.  DEFINING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
 
Understanding unjust enrichment is essential. The wide range of 
interpretations and debates surrounding the concept, as well as the multi-faceted role 
the term “unjust enrichment” plays in legal rhetoric, complicate comprehension.  
Unjust enrichment eludes definition, its imprecise nature simultaneously lending itself 
to and defying misapplication. Hence appreciating unjust enrichment entails a broad 
and frustratingly inconclusive examination.    
Unjust enrichment can be defined as:  
                                                 
1 The Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No.17 (September 13). 
2 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/16, IIC 1 (2006). 
3 Mihaly International Corporation v Sri Lanka, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/00/2, IIC 170 (2002). 
  7
(1) The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering 
compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably 
expected; (2) A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and 
not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or 
recompense; and (3) The area of law dealing with unjustifiable benefits of 
this kind.”4   
It is also defined as (4) “[a] legal doctrine stating that if a person receives money or 
other property through no effort of his own, at the expense of another, the recipient 
should return the property to the rightful owner, even if the property was not obtained 
illegally.”5 As well, (5) “unjust enrichment is a legal term in English law and in 
several other jurisdictions, denoting a particular type of causative event in which one 
party is unjustly enriched at the expense of another, and an obligation to make 
restitution arises, regardless of liability for wrongdoing.”6   
 In the second and fifth definitions, unjust enrichment invokes two separate 
concepts.  One is a causative event resulting in “unjust enrichment” (which actually 
begs the question), and the other is the remedy—restitution.  Restitution simply 
means returning something to the owner or person entitled to it.  Restitution, 
employed as a legal remedy, is based upon returning gains, unlike compensation for 
damages, which is founded upon the plaintiff’s loss.7   Unjust enrichment, then, is 
both what the claim is based on, and the amount by which the defendant was unjustly 
enriched.  Accordingly, a claim for unjust enrichment can be either a separate cause 
of action or a measure of and justification for an award.  
                                                 
.4 Black’s Legal Dictionary, 2004, (8th ed. 2004), Thomson, definition of “unjust enrichment”.   
5Online Legal Dictionary, (NOLO) definition of “unjust enrichment”, available at 
http://www.nolo.com/definition.cfm/Term/D87B554E-A16D-4320-81572AA5FB784730/alpha/U/ 
6 Wikipedia, “Unjust Enrichment” at www.wikipedia.org,  
7 Wikipedia, “Restitution” at www.wikipedia.org. 
  8
 Restitution and unjust enrichment are inextricably intertwined.  While the 
principle of unjust enrichment underlies restitution claims, restitution as a remedy is 
available where unjust enrichment is not the cause of action (at least in common law 
countries).8  Two causes of action can trigger restitution: wrongs committed and 
unjust enrichment.9  Generally, in a claim based on wrongs committed, compensation 
is awarded according to the loss suffered.  In some instances, however, the loss is 
speculative or unsubstantiated, leaving the plaintiff without compensation.  Courts 
may remedy this by measuring damages based on the respondent’s “unjust” gains, 
also known as restitution.  
 Alternatively, courts allow claims whose sole cause of action is unjust 
enrichment.  In this instance, restitution is the only remedy permitted.  While British 
courts allow plaintiffs to choose unjust enrichment as a remedy in cases where it 
provides greater compensation than loss-based alternatives,10 some countries only 
allow restitution when it would award less than a loss-based remedy.11  These 
divergences impact when, where, how, and why a plaintiff and/or a court would use 
unjust enrichment as a cause of action and as a measure of damages.12  This 
distinction also means that a choice must be made between the limited French code 
compensation method and the common law concept of disgorgement.  In Section B, 
below, I quickly introduce some national parameters of unjust enrichment. 
1. Domestic Legal Codes: Unjust Enrichment 
 
Common law countries are not unitary in their understanding of unjust 
enrichment. While English courts seek enrichment “at the expense of the claimant,” 
                                                 
8 See Dickson, Brice, “Unjust Enrichment Claims: A Comparative Overview” [1995] Cambridge Law 
Journal 54(1), 100. 
9 Wikipedia, “Unjust Enrichment”. 
10 See Dickson at 106. 
11 Id. at 113-115 (France is one such example).  
12 See Id.   
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there is no explicit reference to the claimant suffering a loss.13  Conversely, under 
U.S. law the claimant must show “an impoverishment.”14  
 As well, U.S. law requires a connection between loss and gain, and if 
interpreted like French law, the connection must be direct.  Also, where English law 
asks what remedies should be applied, U.S. law seeks “an absence of a remedy,” 
implying that U.S. courts, unlike English courts (but like French courts), use unjust 
enrichment only where no other claim can be made. 
 Lastly, where U.S. courts increasingly use “absence of justification for 
enrichment,” England employs, “was the enrichment unjust?”  Again, U.S. usage 
mimics the civil law approach. The “enrichment unjust” approach requires the 
claimant to identify at least one specific factor legally recognized as rendering the 
defendant’s enrichment unjust. On the contrary, the “absence of justification 
approach” identifies enrichments with no legitimate explanatory basis, without 
looking to black-letter legal factors. 
Indeed, U.S. treatment of unjust enrichment mirrors France in all but one key 
area, disgorgement. Modern French textbooks generally agree that an unjust 
enrichment claim must satisfy five prerequisites:  
                                                 
13 Five stages of analysis guide most English lawmakers. (1)Was the defendant enriched? (2) Was the 
enrichment at the expense of the claimant? (3) Was the enrichment unjust? (4) Does the defendant have 
a defense? (5) What remedies are available to Claimant?13  Each of these stages presents complications 
domestically, not to mention internationally.  Enrichment, for example, could be both tangible 
(monetary) and intangible (use of a nature reserve).  And who determines when enrichment is “unjust”, 
particularly since it does not require a wrongdoing or illegality.”English law relies on the following 
factors to determine step 3 “unjust enrichment”: mistake of fact, mistake of law, duress, undue 
influence, total failure of consideration, and miscellaneous policy-based unjust factors such as 
‘withdrawal within the locus poenitentiae’.  English law also relies on: ignorance/powerlessness, 
unconscionability, partial failure of consideration, and absence of consideration.  These last four, 
however, are more controversial [Burrows, The Law of Restitution at p. 7; Dickson at p.106; Birks, 
“The English Recognition of Unjust Enrichment” [1991] L.M.C.Q 473] 
14 The United States bases its legal framework on the 3rd Restatement of Restitution.  In practice courts 
look to satisfy five components: (1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a connection between 
enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) absence of a justification for the enrichment and 
impoverishment (this has also been stated as “was the enrichment unjust”), (5) absence of a remedy 
provided by the law [Schroeder v. Buchhilz, 2001 ND 36, 622 N.W.2d 202]. 
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“(1) the plaintiff’s loss must be a direct or indirect consequence of the 
defendant’s enrichment, though the defendant can be required to pay only the 
lesser of the plaintiff’s loss or the defendant’s own enrichment; (2) the 
plaintiff must not have been at fault; (3) the plaintiff must not have acted in his 
or her own interest; (4) neither the enrichment nor the related impoverishment 
must be legally justifiable; (5) no other remedy than the action de in rem verso 
must be available in law for the kind of loss in question.15 
French courts allow the plaintiff “only the lesser of the plaintiff’s loss or defendant’s 
own enrichment.”  Hence, the award is capped at the amount of the plaintiff’s loss.  
This means that French parameters do not allow for disgorgement of profits.16  
Conversely, U.S. law, while requiring some loss, does not limit the quantum of the 
award to the plaintiff’s loss, but rather uses the defendant’s gain to set the quantum 
limit. This distinction has substantial practical implications, as the quantum under 
each approach may vary wildly. Thus, a choice must be made as to which country’s 
standard to follow, the more limited award or the more expansive.  
Luckily, other European countries’ civil codes permit and inspire compromise. 
Italian unjust enrichment law, for example, resembles French law quantum 
limitations, but appears to create a carve out for bad faith, “the defendant must pay the 
lesser of the impoverishment suffered by the plaintiff or the enrichment enjoyed by 
the defendant: only if the defendant has acted in bad faith is the defendant fully 
                                                 
15 Dickson at 113. 
16 In addition, the French preclude any cases wherein the plaintiff benefited or was at fault.  This prima 
facie excludes any case involving illegal activity or gain by the plaintiff.  Dickson explains that the 
French notion of faute (fault), “is wider than the notion of negligence in English law.  It embraces 
intentional as well as merely careless conduct… A plaintiff who is in breach of contract cannot 
therefore claim restitution against the other contracting party and a plaintiff who compromises an 
honest claim cannot later try to get out of the arrangement by claiming restitution.16 Dickson continues 
exploring the wide notion of faute in the context of “the plaintiff must not have acted in his or her own 
interest”16.  “A plaintiff who undertakes work for his or her own benefit cannot claim restitution from a 
defendant who also happens, whether accidentally or not, to benefit from the work.” [114] 
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liable.”17 And, the German code for unjust enrichment nearly parallels the Anglo-
American code. 
German scholars identify two types of unjust enrichment claims: 
Eingriffskondiktionen (unlawful interference) and Leistungskondiktionen 
(performance derived).18  Each type elicits different legal treatment.  Leistung applies 
to frustrated/defective contracts.  The law requires that restitution occur even when a 
“legal justification existed for the enrichment at the time of its occurrence but has 
later disappeared or when an anticipated purpose to be fulfilled but the performance 
does not materialize.”19  More importantly, Eingriffskondiktionen does not 
“presuppose that the plaintiff suffers a loss.  A person who uses a machine which 
otherwise would have been lying idle, is therefore liable under this head.”20   The 
German conception of unjust enrichment compensation must mirror the Anglo-
American idea of disgorgement -- if no loss is required to find unjust enrichment, it 
follows that loss cannot limit the award.  
2. International Unjust Enrichment: Creating Universal 
Parameters 
 
Exploring national parameters leaves us at a stalemate, particularly regarding 
disgorgement. Because the amount awarded under disgorgement could be markedly 
greater than that reflected solely in the plaintiff’s loss, leaving the matter open would 
breed inconsistencies.  As I will explore later, inconsistency undermines expectations, 
                                                 
17 Id at 119, see also Italian Civil Code of 1942 (arts 2041-2042). “there must be a causal nexus 
between the plaintiff’s impoverishment and the defendant’s enrichment, as well as absence of any good 
legal reason for either phenomenonThe defendant cannot claim an allowance for payments he or she 
has had to make by virtue of receiving the enrichment, nor can the defendant claim compensation for 
improvements.  The defendant is liable even if he or she is an indirect beneficiary of enrichment and 
even if the plaintiff, in paying money that was not due the defendant, made no mistake.”  
18 Ibid at 120 
19 Ibid at 121 
20 Ibid at 121 
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and weakens the concept itself.  As well, participants should know what the 
appropriate remedy is.  As international law expands, precision in awards acquires 
utmost importance, and national conceptions of a concept should not impact quantum.  
Thus, some determination must be made ex-anti.  Past practice provides 
minimal guidance on the matter.  The Iran-US Claims Tribunal employs U.S. 
parameters, lending some small support to the idea of disgorgement. All of the cases 
therein, however, could be considered to reflect the overlap between the plaintiff’s 
loss and defendant’s gain.  
 My instinct is to choose the common law and German option. First, the 
common law option includes the French conception.  Conversely, selecting the French 
award method would preclude elements of the common law option (disgorgement). 
With a more expansive option, jurists can take into account contributing factors, and 
limit the award accordingly. Indeed, most common law scholars and courts factor in 
considerations such as bad faith and ignorance.21 Conversely, upfront limitations may 
handicap jurists. As well, some international cases seem to include the idea of 
disgorgement.22 
As I will explore below, the area in which unjust enrichment has real utility is 
in intellectual property dispute resolution.  In intellectual property cases, the amount 
gained often far surpasses the amount lost.  And disgorgement of profits is the reason 
that unjust enrichment is such an apt remedy.  Know-how is very difficult to price, 
and an idea without action may be worthless. Thus, limiting the amount awarded to 
the plaintiff’s loss would cripple the utility of unjust enrichment, and make 
determining the quantum extremely difficult.  For intellectual property cases, then, 
there will be an efficiency loss, as plaintiffs must prove both the elusive quantum of 
                                                 
21 See the compensation section below. 
22 Takings cases in the ICJ, like Papamichlous, are one example. 
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the loss and the gain.  This is not to say that if there is a significant loss a tribunal 
could not use that as a cap for the award, just that the tribunal should not be limited to 
that.   
Thus, for the sake of this paper, and perhaps inviting torrents of criticism, I 
assume that unjust enrichment includes the possibility of disgorgement of profits 
above and beyond the loss suffered.  Although making an admittedly arbitrary 
decision invites discomfort, having a single, universally applied conception of unjust 
enrichment is critical.  International investment disputes deal with enough confusion, 
and the tenets of legal concepts should not contribute.   Having decided to include 
disgorgement, I continue exploring my proposed parameters for international unjust 
enrichment.  
For clarity (and because I am exploring it in the context of ICSID), I will use 
the definition relied on by a few of the ICSID tribunals.  These tribunals borrowed 
their definition from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases, thus it reflects U.S. unjust 
enrichment tenets: 
The concept of unjust enrichment is recognized as a general principle 
of international law. It gives one party a right of restitution of anything 
of value that has been taken or received by the other party without a 
legal justification. As the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has stated more 
specifically: 
There must have been an enrichment of one party to the 
detriment of the other, and both must arise as a consequence of 
the same act or event. There must be no justification for the 
enrichment, and no contractual or other remedy available to 
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the injured party whereby he might seek compensation from the 
party enriched.23 
Thus there are five requirements in an unjust enrichment claim: (1) an enrichment, (2) 
an impoverishment, (3) a connection between the enrichment and the 
impoverishment, (4) absence of a justification for the enrichment and the 
impoverishment (this has also been stated as “was the enrichment unjust?”24), and (5) 
absence of a remedy provided by the law. 25   
Claims in unjust enrichment boast a number of defenses. Complete defenses 
defeat the whole claim.  Partial defenses reduce the value of the claim. Defenses 
include: change of position, agency/ministerial receipt, bona fide purchase for value 
without notice (not available to defendants who were enriched directly from the 
claimant), counter-restitution, and illegality.26   I will briefly define each of these 
defenses, in turn.  
   “Change of position” reduces the value of the claim against the defendant 
where the defendant shows he changed his position in good faith reliance on the 
enrichment.27  “Agency/ministerial receipt” applies where the defendant received the 
enrichment as an agent and handed it over without notice of the plaintiff’s claim.28  
“Bona fide purchase for value without notice” may be raised through a third party by 
                                                 
23 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Judgment of the Swiss Tribunal, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL 
Rules, IIC 211 (2006) at para. 449, citing Benjamin Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, Iran –US Claims Tribunal. 
24 US courts are increasingly using “absence of justification for enrichment”, England employs, “was 
the enrichment unjust.”  US usage mimics the civil law approach. The “enrichment unjust” approach 
requires the claimant to identify at least one specific factor legally recognized as rendering the 
defendant’s enrichment unjust. On the contrary, the “absence of justification approach” identifies 
enrichments with no legitimate explanatory basis, without looking to black-letter legal factors. 
25 Schroeder v. Buchhilz, 2001 ND 36, 622 N.W.2d 202; these tenets have been explored and upheld in 
other Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases, such as Future Trading Inc. Khuzestan Water and Power 
Authority, 9 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R., 46 (1985), Schlegel Corporation v National Iranian Copper Industries 
Company 14 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R., 176 (1987). 
26 Dickson at 107.   
27 Peter Birks, “An Introduction to the Law of Restitution”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK 
(1985) at 410. 
28 Id. at 432 
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parties who received the claimant’s property indirectly.29 “Counter-restitution” 
applies if the claimant’s claim would leave the claimant unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the defendant.30 “Illegality” prevents the claimant from relying on 
evidence of his own illegal acts to show that he has a claim against the defendant.  In 
such cases, the court may refuse to help him.31 
If the five components are satisfied and no defense succeeds, then the claimant 
is entitled to a gains-based remedy, often equated with restitution.  Restitution may 
require returning property or awarding equivalent compensation.32  
While many scholars separate unjust enrichment from restitution, some see the 
two as inseparable.  For example Andrew Kull, the reporter for the New Restatement 
of Restitution (U.S.), states: 
My proposition is that the law of restitution be defined exclusively in terms of 
its core idea, the law of unjust enrichment. By this definition it would be 
axiomatic that (i) no liability could be asserted in restitution other than one 
referable to the unjust enrichment of the defendant, and (ii) that the measure of 
recovery in restitution must in every case be the extent of the defendant's 
                                                 
29 Id. at 439 
30 Id. at 415 
31 Id. at 424  
32 Id. at 25.  See also Dickson (This is a common law oriented exploration of unjust enrichment, in 
keeping with Bank Isaiah.  Knowing the law of the Respondent country is key. Dickson explores 
German, French, Italian, Dutch, English, and US laws on unjust enrichment. French law introduces 
new limitations to unjust enrichment claims.  Firstly, they are a last resort in that “no other 
remedy…must be available (113).”  Unjust enrichment as a measure of damages is also a last resort if 
the rules are followed to their logical conclusion.  Notice that French courts allow the plaintiff “only 
the lesser of the plaintiff’s loss or defendant’s own enrichment.”  This means that given the option, a 
plaintiff will never opt for unjust enrichment if another remedy is available.  Again, like the United 
States, an unjust enrichment claim is an exclusive cause of action, useful where nothing else is 
available.  In addition, the French preclude any cases wherein the plaintiff benefited or was at fault.  
 
  16
unjust enrichment.33  
Kull’s argument is summed up well in the Restatement (Third) Restitution “a person 
who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the other, 
and further noting that the law of restitution is the law of unjust enrichment.”34 Even 
if the claimant brought a case under a different cause of action, where a court awards 
restitution, there is an acknowledgement of and reliance upon unjust enrichment.35
 Prominent scholars like Peter Birks disagree, preferring to divide the two 
concepts.36  Birks distinguishes unjust enrichment from wrongful enrichment, and 
claims that restitution can follow either; therefore restitution and unjust enrichment 
can be unrelated.  In wrongful enrichment, according to Birks, there is already a 
breach or wrong of some kind, and thus the remedy (restitution) is not founded on 
unjust enrichment.  Only where there is no “wrong” can one find unjust enrichment.37 
I agree with Birks on a practical level, as demonstrated in instances like the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, where they required that there be no other available cause of action 
before allowing an unjust enrichment claim.  Hence unjust enrichment only applied 
where no legal wrong could be found. This threshold requirement recognizes Birks’ 
distinction as a functional limitation on unjust enrichment claims.   
Theoretically, however, restitution is a gains-based remedy, and to provide a 
gains-based remedy the court must intuitively justify it on grounds that the gain was 
inappropriate.   I would adopt Kull and Smith’s view, while recognizing that courts 
                                                 
33 Andrew Kull, 'Rationalizing Restitution' 83 Calif. L. Rev. 1191 (1995) at 1196.   
34 American Jurisprudence 2d, Restitution Generally on Westlaw. 
35 Stephen A. Smith, The Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law:  Is Restitution a Right or a Remedy?,36 
Loyola. L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2003) at 1061 (although, he uses the terms “direct” and “remedial” to 
describe “cause of action” and unjust enrichment as a “remedy”).   
36 Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, Texas Law Symposium: Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment, (Jan 12-13, 2001) available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/restitution/birks.doc. 
29 Id. at 27  
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may apply practical limitations to protect the integrity of contract and other policy 
interests. Thus, while for clarity of thought and in keeping with divisions created by 
courts, I explore the two separately, it is important to note that I consider the two 
indivisible. This non-distinction is particularly salient later in the Article, as assuming 
interchangeability allows me to leapfrog from remedial unjust enrichment within 
Chorzów to using unjust enrichment as a cause of action in an intellectual property 
case.  Having sketched unjust enrichment, I now explore its role in international law, 
moving from early cases to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.    
B. UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Many consider unjust enrichment a general principle of law. Some, like the 
Saluka Tribunal, see it as a general principle of international law.38  Others, like 
Georg Schwarzenberger, fall somewhere in between.  “On the fringes of international 
law, the principle [of unjust enrichment] tends to already be accepted as a general 
principle of law, recognized by civilized nations.”39  
Most legal systems recognize unjust enrichment.40  The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice Article 38(I)(c) states that “[th]e Court, whose function 
is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply … the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”41  
According to Moore and echoed by Whiteman: 
"Article 38 of the Statute also directs to Court to apply 'the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations.' As all nations are civilized, as ‘law 
implies civilization,' the reference to 'civilized nations' can serve only to 
                                                 
38Saluka at 449.   
39 Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law vol. 1, p.580, 655 (1957).   
40 This is supported in part by my exploration above.  Also note that Latin American countries, and 
Shar’ia law countries recognize unjust enrichment.  
41 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.1(c) (1945). 
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exclude from consideration primitive systems of law.”  It empowers the Court 
to go outside the field in which States have expressed their will to accept 
certain principles of law as governing their relations inter se, and to draw upon 
principles common to various systems of municipal law or generally agreed 
upon among interpreters of municipal law.  It authorizes use to be made of 
analogies found in the national law of the various States."42 
Under Moore’s analysis, Article 38(I)(c) permits international courts to use 
unjust enrichment because it is one of the “general principles of law recognized in 
civilized nations.”43  This statement is not merely my derivative logic.  In Whiteman’s 
Treatise on International Law, she quotes Lord McNair: 
"It may be asked: What are these 'general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations'?  Where are they to be found?  It is not possible to point to 
any code or book containing them.  Much of the content of public 
international law proper has been developed by tribunals and by writers out of 
these general principles, and my view is that same source will prove equally 
fruitful in the application and interpretation of those contracts which, though 
not interstate contracts and therefore not governed by public international law 
stricto sensu, can more effectively be regulated by general principles of law 
than by special rules of any single territorial system.  They will be developed 
both by contracting parties who realize the suitability of general principles of 
law and by tribunals which are called upon to adjudicate upon contracts of this 
type.  I do not propose to prepare a list of the rules of law likely to be 
recognized as 'general principles.'  'Unjust enrichment' has been referred to 
                                                 
42 Whiteman, Treatise on International Law, page 90, volume 1, quoting Moore. 
43 See also Oppenheim, Vol 1, "The meaning of that phrase (Art. 38) has been the subject of much 
discussion.  The intention is to authorize the Court to apply the general principles of municipal 
jurisprudence, in particular private law, in so far as they are applicable to relations of States.  (p.29) 
 According to Oppenheim, "Paragraph 3 of Art. 38 nevertheless constitutes an important landmark in 
the history of international law inasmuch as the States parties to the Statute did expressly recognize the 
existence of a 3rd source of international law, independent of, although merely supplementary to, 
custom or treaty.  This was in fact the practice of international arbitration before the establishment of 
the Court, in its establishment a number of international tribunals, although not bound by the Statute, 
have treated x as declaratory of existing law. (Cites Lena and others). And Bin Cheng at page. 173, "It 
would seem therefore that an act is internationally unlawful whether it violates a treaty, a rule of 
customary international law, or a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations." 
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above in the Lena Goldfields Award, and I shall mention only one other likely 
candidate, among many, for recognition [Respect for Acquired Rights]."44   
The above quote supports the idea that a concept becomes part of international law 
through multinational recognition coupled with use by subsequent tribunals. And 
Lord McNair and Whiteman use unjust enrichment as the example of this 
phenomenon. In support of Lord McNair, I demonstrated widespread recognition 
above in my domestic exploration; and in the next few sentences I will demonstrate 
international tribunals’ use. In International Damages Volume 3, Whiteman explores 
quasi-contractual damages.45  In case after case, she finds that:  
International law includes within its compass a large body of equity. 
 Accordingly the extent to which claimants have been allowed to recover 
damages in international cases on grounds of equity apart from legal rights 
under existing contracts constitutes an important phase of the subject under 
discussion [damages]. There are numerous cases where damages have been 
allowed in situations resembling, more or less closely, an implied or quasi-
contractual relation.  Various reasons are given for the allowance of damages 
on such cases. At other times the reason is stated in the familiar terms of 
"equity" and, at other times, merely on the ground that international law 
allows recovery in such a situation.  Whatever the reason given in the 
decision, the important point is that damages are allowed in situations where it 
might be difficult to explain the decision on grounds of either the wrongful 
breach of or interference with an express contract."   
Whiteman goes on to list dozens of international arbitrations employing some type of 
                                                 
44 Whiteman at 93, quoting Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized 
Nations", XXXIII Brit. Yb. Int'l L. (1957) 1,15-16.  Also refers to Lauterpacht, 67-71, and Cheng. 
45 International Damages Volume 3, Whiteman, from pages 1732 to 1760, 
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unjust enrichment.46 She closes with two cases, both of which house language 
supporting the idea that unjust enrichment is a general principle of international 
law.47  
 Even given this wealth of evidence, unjust enrichment’s current status 
remains unclear.  This may be due to Cristoph Schreurer’s 1974 work cautioning 
against using unjust enrichment liberally, and subsequent (resulting?) sloppiness and 
embarrassment surrounding its application.  As well, while most countries accept 
unjust enrichment claims, their prerequisites vary, and since unjust enrichment lacks a 
universal conception, it remains an amorphous and open-ended legal area.  
Unjust enrichment’s tentative standing and open-ended parameters are further 
complicated by its inherently moral nature.48  Determining who deserves to be 
enriched is a loaded policy decision.  Judges dealing with countries and investors are 
balancing very complicated economic interests, and thus prefer to circumvent any 
accusations of bias.  Some might argue that only in cases where the morality is clearer 
than the panel’s legal legitimacy, as in Lena Goldfields, would employing unjust 
                                                 
46 Whiteman at 1734.  Referring to payment of excessive taxes, use or benefit enjoyed "there have been 
a large number of cases where damages have been allowed for the seizure of private property for public 
use or benefit.  While the decisions were not necessarily couched in terms of implied contract or unjust 
enrichment, they distinctly hold that where property is taken for the public use or benefit thee is a duty 
under international law to make compensation thereof."   She provides also examples of cases from 
Also discusses quantum meruit (1741); supplies furnished (1746) "services performed" (1748), work 
and labor done (1753),  "expenses incurred" "in good faith reliance upon acts of the respondent 
government", and "advances made.” 
47 Id. at 1760, citing Govenment of Turkey v. Sir W. J. Armstrong Whitworth and Co. and Vickers 
Ltd., VIII Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes (1928) 996, 1001, translation. "[T]he 
extinction of the contractual obligation leaves in existence, however, the pecuniary obligations 
resulting from the acts performed before the extinction, as this latter should not result in the illegal 
enrichment of one of the parties to the detriment of the other; as there is no reason to presume that the 
Treaty intended to set aside this fundamental principle, so much in conformity with the rules of equity, 
but just the opposite, since the Treaty orders the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to be guided by justice, 
equity, and good faith, and as to the application of the rules of equity is required in particular when it 
comes to disputes arising from the interpretation of contracts, we should therefore assume that it is the 
duty of the Tribunal to decide whether and to what degree the defendants have benefited by an 
ungrounded enrichment at the expense of the claimants. 
48 American Jurisprudence 2d, Restitution Generally (“Restitution is based not upon contract or statute, 
but upon justice, morals, equity, and good conscience”). 
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enrichment behoove the tribunal.49 If the act is not per se illegal, adjudging the 
enrichment unjust to one party requires selecting a deserving party.  Indeed, according 
to Andrew Burrows, “in some areas the law is best explained as responding to policy 
constraints on the pure principle of unjust enrichment.”50    
 These caveats, however, should not and have not deterred courts from relying 
on unjust enrichment.  If anything, they explain why courts are not always explicit 
about their reliance thereupon.  Often, if another legal remedy or cause of action is 
available, arbitral panels choose the more established remedy or cause of action.  
And, more importantly, claimants only raise unjust enrichment as a subsidiary cause 
of action or where it offers greater benefits as a remedy.  Neither motive likely elicits 
favorable treatment from tribunals.  These complications may explain why ICSID 
tribunals have not yet explicitly relied on unjust enrichment, but are not enough to 
keep international tribunals from using it.  
 Unjust enrichment is a useful cause of action and remedy, and a general 
principle of law at the very least.  The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal definition, with 
disgorgement potential, creates a standard that can be applied universally.  A 
universal standard does two things.  First, it will limit abuses of unjust enrichment, 
both implicit (where it is silently imported into unrelated damage calculations and 
distorts the resulting quantum) and explicit (cheap shots and unsubstantiated uses).  
Second, a universal standard will create a well-defined and welcome space for unjust 
enrichment in international investment dispute resolution.  
1. Early Tribunals  
 
                                                 
49 This case was one of the first international arbitrations, and the legal legitimacy of the tribunal was 
unclear.  The tribunal was a rushed and ad hoc affair.   
50 Burrows, The Law of Restitution at p. 7 
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From the 1890’s onward tribunals relied on unjust enrichment.  Lena 
Goldfields is perhaps the mother of all unjust enrichment claims in investment 
disputes.51 The USSR breached a concession contract with the Lena Goldfields 
mining company by creating circumstances fatal to Lena’s business.  The Company 
claimed damages for contract breach or “alternatively, restitution of the full present 
value of the Company’s property by which the government had been unjustly 
enriched.”52  The ad hoc arbitral panel, having only a day to debate and faced with the 
novel and politically charged task of ruling against a country, awarded damages for 
unjust enrichment.53  Relying on Soviet and Continental European law, the court 
determined: 
The conduct of the Government was a breach of the contract going to 
the root of it. In consequence Lena is entitled to be relieved from the 
burden of further obligations there under and to be compensated in 
money for the value of the benefits of which it has been wrongfully 
deprived.  On ordinary legal principles this constitutes a right of action 
for damages, but the Court prefers to base its award on the principle of 
“unjust enrichment”, although in its opinion the money result is the 
same.54 
 
Other cases also relied on remedial unjust enrichment, including Thomas C 
Baker’s Case,55 Sucrerie de Roustchouk v. Etat hongrais,56 The Edna,57 Spanish Zone 
                                                 
51 Lena Goldfields, supra note X (PLEASE NOTE, I’ve left supra’s unfinished, as I assume edits will 
rearrange footnotes); See also V.V. Veeder, “Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of 
Three Ideas” (1998) 47 Int’l & Comp. Law. Quarterly  747. 
52 Id. at paras.23–24 
53 See Veeder. 
54 See Lena Goldfields.   
55 Thomas C. Baker Case, Moore, International Arbitration vol. 4, p.3668 (1898). 
56 Sucrerie de Roustchouk v. Etat hongrais, Recueil des decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 772 
(1926) 
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Morocco Case,58 General Finance Corporation v United Mexican States,59 William A 
Parker v United Mexican States,60 and the Landreau Arbitration.61  The Landreau 
Arbitration,62 for example, involved two brothers (French and American) with a 
concession to find guano in Peru.  In keeping with the contract’s terms, they provided 
the Peruvian government with information identifying guano deposits.  The United 
States sued on the American brother’s behalf after Peru refused to make the stipulated 
payments and repudiated the contract.  After finding Peru’s rescission legal, the 
Tribunal held that “[Peru] was bound to pay on a quantum meruit for the discoveries 
which they appropriated for their own benefit.”63 
As well, in both William A. Parker v. United Mexican States64 and General 
Finance Corporation v. United Mexican States the tribunals awarded restitution 
where contracts were considered void.  In General Finance, the tribunal required 
Mexico to “reimburse claimant to the extent it has been unjustly enriched” for water 
concession contracts considered void for delegating sovereign authority.65 
  Additionally, the Peace Treaties following World War I employed unjust 
enrichment to compensate companies whose business contracts had been dissolved 
                                                                                                                                           
57 The Edna, 34 Am. J. Int’l L. 737 (1940) 
58 Spanish Zone Morocco Case, 2 R.I.A.A. 616 
59 General Finance Corporation, US Dept of State, Publication 2859, Arbitration Series 9,546. 
60  William A Parker v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 35. 
61 Landreau Arbitration, 1 R..I.A.A 352. 
62 Id. at 294.   
63 Id. at 294. Interestingly, Schreurer used this case and others to argue that unjust enrichment was 
primarily a remedy, and should remain thus until a more uniform standard for unjust enrichment is set. 
There are two possible responses to Schreurer. First, examining the Landreu Arbitration makes clear 
that the Tribunal allowed a claim for unjust enrichment.  The Tribunal’s statement that the rescission 
was legal means there was no illegal wrong to be remedied.  Thus, in awarding a remedy, they must 
have admitted a claim of unjust enrichment to justify any award whatsoever.  That is, perhaps, an 
inconsequential argument. More importantly, and addressing Schreurer’s valid concern about lacking 
“a precise range of application,”63 Schreurer’s argument should no longer prevent tribunals from using 
unjust enrichment, as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has laid the groundwork for this “precise range.”   
Indeed, the inconsistency ICSID cases show is unjustified given the precedent set by the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, and the relative ease that tribunal experienced in applying them. 
64 Id. at 296. 
65 Id. at 296. 
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during the war.  According to Christoph Schreurer, these Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
frequently applied “restitutionary techniques based on considerations of unjust 
enrichment,”66 where uncompleted business dealings had lost their contractual basis.   
The Chorzów Factory Case may be both the most famous and most 
unrecognized example of this. ICSID tribunals rely heavily on Chorzów as precedent 
for remedies.  Thus, showing that experts in Chorzów would have explored unjust 
enrichment if Poland and Germany had not settled, would contribute significantly to 
establishing unjust enrichment as a general principle of international law.  Below, I 
attempt to do exactly that, arguing that Chorzów endorses unjust enrichment.  This 
reading challenges conventional interpretations of Chorzów as solely endorsing 
expectation damages.    
2. The Chorzów Factory case  
 
The German government sued Poland for expropriating a private German 
investor’s factory after World War I.  Poland was allowed to seize German state 
companies in its territory, but was not permitted to occupy private interests.  The 
German government had sold the Chorzów factory to a private company at a deep 
discount before its seizure in 1922. Poland operated and developed the Chorzów 
factory from the time of seizure until 1928, the date of the award.67 
Germany won the case. The Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) 
found that since the seizure didn’t comply with treaty regulations, it was not merely 
an expropriation, but rather an illegal seizure meriting damages above and beyond 
restitution.68  Restitution was the Geneva Convention’s prescribed remedy for 
                                                 
66 Christoph Schreurer,“Unjustified Enrichment in International Law”, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 281, 289 (1974).  See also Whiteman, Damages. 
67See The Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No.17 (September 13). 
68 Id at 39-40. 
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expropriation.69  Using restitution as its baseline, the Chorzów Tribunal laid out a 
menu of award calculations. The case settled, so the expert never chose the best 
calculation method.  Before settlement, however, the Tribunal presented the following 
questions to the expert:  
I. A. What was the value, on July 3rd, 1922, expressed in Reichsmarks 
current at the present time, of the undertaking for the manufacture of 
nitrate products of which the factory was situated at Chorzów in Polish 
Upper Silesia, in the state in which that undertaking (including the 
lands, buildings, equipment, stocks and processes at its disposal, 
supply and delivery contracts, goodwill and future prospects) was, on 
the date indicated, in the hands of the Bayerische and Oberschlesische 
Stickstoffwerke? 
I. B. What would have been the financial results, expressed in 
Reichsmarks current at the present time (profits or losses), which 
would probably have been given by the undertaking thus constituted 
from July 3rd, 1922., to the date of the present judgment, if it had been 
in the hands of the said Companies? 
II. What would be the value at the date of the present judgment, 
expressed in Reichsmarks current at the present time, of the same 
undertaking (Chorzów) if that undertaking (Including lands, buildings, 
equipment, stocks, available processes, supply and delivery contracts, 
goodwill and future prospects) had remained in the hands of the 
Bayerische and Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, and had either 
remained substantially as it was in 1922 or had been developed 
proportionately on lines similar to those applied in the case of other 
undertakings of the same kind, controlled by the Bayerische, for 
instance, the undertaking of which the factory is situated at 
Piesteritz?70 
 
Question I invites one key inquiry.  While the Tribunal clearly awards 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Id at 43-44. 
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restitution for the value of the company at the time of taking, what exactly are they 
offering post-1922?  The question, “[w]hat would [have been] the financial 
results….which would probably have been given by the undertaking thus constituted 
from …1922 to…the present judgment, if it [the factory] had been in the hands of the 
said Companies?” welcomes two interpretations.  
 Under the first interpretation, Part B of the award is based on hypothetical 
profits/losses.  If so, what constitutes the basis for these losses/profits? In Question II 
the Tribunal mentioned using data from a similar company to approximate Chorzów’s 
gains/losses.  But analogous company data is mentioned explicitly in reference to 
calculating damages for Question II, current fair market value. 
   The second way to read the question is to assume that the Tribunal, when 
referring to “in the hands of the said Companies,” was speaking about “the 
Companies” [Chorzów] as beneficiaries of the profits/losses.  The Tribunal then was 
asking that the expert examine the books from Chorzów during the years Poland ran 
it, and use those real profits and losses to determine what should be awarded the 
deprived Companies.   
The Tribunal further muddled this point by subsequently supporting both 
hypotheses.   
The purpose of question I is to determine the monetary value, both of 
the object[s] which should have been restored in kind and of the 
additional damage, on the basis of the estimated value of the 
undertaking including stocks at the moment of taking possession by 
the Polish Government, together with any probable profit that would 
have accrued to the undertaking between the date of taking possession 
and that of the expert opinion.71 
The above statement, with its use of “probable profit” supports the first interpretation.  
                                                 
71 Id. at 44.   
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And yet, a later statement seems to support the second interpretation.   
As regards the lucrum cessans, in relation to question II, it may be 
remarked that the cost of upkeep of the corporeal objects forming part 
of the undertaking and even the cost of improvement and normal 
development of the installation and of the industrial property 
incorporated therein, are bound to absorb in a large measure the 
profits, real or supposed, of the undertaking. Up to a certain point, 
therefore, any profit may be left out of account, for it will be included 
in the real or supposed value of the undertaking at the present 
moment. If, however, the reply given by the experts to question I B 
should show that after making good the deficits for the years during 
which the factory was working at a loss, and after due provision for 
the cost of upkeep and normal improvement during the following 
years, there remains a margin of profit, the amount of such profit 
should be added to the compensation to be awarded.72 
Only the actual Chorzów factory operations could yield “real” profits.  And recall that 
Question IB addresses profits between 1922 and the present.  So if the Tribunal was 
asking the expert to calculate profits and losses based on the “years during which the 
factory was working at loss” and “real” profits are to be taken into account, then 
Question I must be relying on Chorzów’s financial information while under the Polish 
government.   
If the Tribunal was awarding the value of the property at taking plus any real 
profits the Polish government made from the factory during the years it controlled the 
factory, then the Tribunal was effectively awarding the amount by which Poland was 
enriched, or in other words, unjust enrichment.  Whereas hypothetical lost profits are 
damages based on what the Claimant could have earned; relying on the current value 
of the factory or awarding the amount that the Polish government was actually 
enriched was a gains-based calculation.   
                                                 
72 Id. at 45 (italics added for emphasis). 
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Interestingly, the mention of using “real” profits to calculate “lucrums 
cessans” in Question II also introduces a gains-based remedy to Question II. Just 
calculating the FMV including the future flow of profits, involves evaluating the 
value at taking and then projecting a growth rate comparable to that of a like company 
and estimating the resulting potential profits.  This calculation leaves no space for real 
profits.  Hence, repeated referrals to real profits when presenting Question II mean 
that the Tribunal also wanted to assess the current value of the factory in determining 
the remedy. Having both the hypothetical future value and the current value of 
Chorzów allowed the Tribunal additional remedy options.  As awarding the Claimant 
the current value of the factory is a gains-based recovery (the Claimant walks away 
with the value-added by the Respondent), the Tribunal clearly intended to include the 
unjust enrichment award option.   
Other language in the Chorzów opinion suggests that the Tribunal requested 
an unjust enrichment calculation.  The Tribunal’s decision to include the value of the 
chemical factory in the value of Chorzów, even though the factory was not built and 
unapproved at the time of the seizure, is one such example: 
It must be stated that the Chorzów factory to be valued by the experts 
includes also the chemical factory. Besides the arguments which, in 
the Polish Government's opinion, tend to show that the working of the 
said factory was not established on a profitable basis-arguments which 
it will be for the experts to consider-that Government has claimed that 
the working depended on a special authorization, which the Polish 
authorities were entitled to refuse. But the Court is of opinion that this 
argument is not well-founded.73 
The Tribunal based its opinion that the argument was “not well-founded” on the 
German company’s plans and on the fact that chemical factories are normal in that 
                                                 
73 Id. at 46.   
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type of business.74It is worth noting, however, that the German companies are getting 
the benefit of the Polish government’s work and expansion. 
In addition, the Chorzów Tribunal, perhaps from necessity, used restitution as 
a starting point, both morally and substantively:  
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - 
a principle which seems to be established by international practice and 
in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation 
must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act 
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if 
this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value 
which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of 
damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution 
in kind or payment in place of it-such are the principles which should 
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary 
to international law.75  
In short, restitution grounds Chorzów. The Tribunal introduced damages to augment 
restitution, and gave the expert a range of options for calculating the additional 
damages.   “The Court considers it preferable to endeavour to ascertain the value to be 
estimated by several methods, in order to permit of a comparison and if necessary of 
completing the results of the one by those of the others.”76 One method the Tribunal 
proposed is what we today would deem expectation damage calculations [calculating 
FMV with future flow of profits by finding the value at taking and then projecting a 
rate comparable to that of a like company].   Another method was restitution plus 
hypothetical lost profits up until the award.  In yet another alternative, the expert 
could have based the award on the disgorgement of the current real value of the 
factory, which would be unjust enrichment, as it would be based on what the Polish 
                                                 
74 Id. at 46.  
75 Id. at 41.   
76 Chorzów at 45. 
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state owned at the time [including future value].  Lastly, the award might be based on 
another unjust enrichment calculation, restoring the value of the factory upon seizure 
plus disgorgement of any real profits the Polish state accrued while it possessed the 
factory.   
ICSID tribunals, citing Chorzów, overwhelmingly focus on the fair market 
value (FMV) option, using the phrase “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-out 
all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in 
all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” to justify their 
damage award.  The International Law Commission (“ILC”) Articles now codify this 
standard.77   
Some tribunals, however, have combined the Chorzów award possibilities.  
The general trend of giving judicial leeway on award calculations may support these 
creative combinations. These cases, including Azurix and LG&E cite SD Myers.  
According to Azurix, “the lack of a measure of compensation in NAFTA for breaches 
other than a finding of expropriation reflected the intention of the parties to leave it 
open to the tribunals to determine it in light of the circumstances of the case taking 
into account the principles of international law and the provisions of NAFTA.”78 
Older cases, while more restrained, did blend Chorzów remedy options, at least in 
dicta.  For example, the resubmitted Amco Tribunal invokes Chorzów and then, in 
dicta, blends unjust enrichment and damages—using one party’s enrichment to 
approximate the other’s sustained damage:79 
                                                 
77 Article 31 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (the Draft Articles or DARS).4 In accordance with the PCIJ, reparation: 
“[…] must, so far as possible wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in 
kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind 
would bear […]” 
78 Azurix at para. 422, 
79 Amco at para.184. 
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If the purpose of compensation is to put Amco in the position it would 
have been in had it received the benefits of the Profit-Sharing 
Agreement [citing Chorzów], then there is no reason of logic that 
requires that to be done by reference only to data that would have been 
known to a prudent businessman in 1980. It may, on one view, be the 
case that in a lawful taking, Amco would have been entitled to the fair 
market value of the contract at the moment of dispossession. In 
making such a valuation, a Tribunal in 1990 would necessarily exclude 
factors subsequent to 1980. But if Amco is to be placed as if the 
contract had remained in effect, then subsequent known factors 
bearing on that performance are to be reflected in the valuation 
technique.80  
The above blending, read in conjunction with the following statement, creates 
a situation wherein the Respondent is responsible for the downside risk of lost value 
due to expropriation and for the upside possibility of increasing the value of the 
investment. “The only subsequent known factors relevant to value which are not to be 
relied on are those attributable to the illegality itself.”81 Read closely, if the value of 
the taking drops because of Respondent, the drop will be excluded.  If, however, the 
Respondent increased the property value, this can be included since it is known data.  
The successful Claimant would get the greater of the actual value (through restitution 
approximation) or the hypothetical value if the actual investment underperformed.   
Then, in ADC v. Hungary,82 the Tribunal used Chorzów to justify an award 
that is clearly remedial unjust enrichment.  ADC v. Hungary is the case that truly 
opens the door for unjust enrichment claims in ICSID.   
                                                 
80 Id. at para.186. The award which Amco receives, however, is consistent only with a damages 
remedy.  So , this is not a condemnation of the award itself, but, rather, to highlight to ambiguity 
introduced through the exploration.   
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
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3. ADC v. Hungary 
 
ADC had a concession to build a new terminal in the Budapest airport.  Their 
contract included the right to operate the entrepreneurial shops at the terminal, handle 
the baggage, and a separate component for managing and training employees.  The 
management-training agreement provided that the Hungarian government would pay 
ADC a fixed fee each year for training airport personnel and management.  After 
ADC completed the new terminal, the Hungarian government passed a law preventing 
ADC from operating the terminal—effectively edging them out.  A few years later, 
after the airport became a major international hub, the Hungarian government sold the 
airport to a British company (BAA) for $1.2 billion dollars.  ADC sued for 
expropriation in ICSID.  
The Tribunal found for ADC.  Finding an “illegal expropriation” since the BIT 
requirements for a “legal” expropriation weren’t met, the Tribunal decided that the 
BIT-prescribed expropriation remedy, restitution of the value of the property at 
taking, did not apply.83 Instead, the Tribunal decided to use the Chorzów customary 
international law standard for “illegal” expropriation.  Relying on Chorzów, the ADC 
Tribunal awarded restitution of the value of the property at the time of the award, 
rather than at the time of expropriation.84  This reflects one of the options granted in 
                                                 
83Id. at p. 36 and 52, BIT Article 4 (1. Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, 
directly or indirectly, investors of the other Contracting Party of their investments unless the following 
conditions are complied with:(a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of 
law; (b) the measures are not discriminatory; (c) the measures are accompanied by provision for the 
payment of just compensation.[emphasis added] 2. The amount of compensation must correspond to 
the market value of the expropriated investments at the moment of the expropriation. [emphasis 
added]3. The amount of this compensation may be estimated according to the laws and regulations of 
the country where the expropriation is made. 4. The compensation must be paid without undue delay 
upon completion of the legal expropriation procedure [emphasis added], but not later than three months 
upon completion of this procedure and shall be transferred in the currency in which the investment is 
made. In the event of delays beyond the three–months' period, the Contracting Party concerned shall be 
liable to the payment of interest based on prevailing rates. [Query whether the standard doesn’t imply 
that all expropriations that come to court are inherently illegal, as, if the criteria were met, the claimant 
would already have received the fair market value of their expropriation.]  
84 See exploration below.   
  33
Chorzów Question II, explored above.  Thus, the Tribunal awarded the Claimant’s 
portion of the increased value of the terminal after Hungary had developed, operated, 
and increased its air traffic.  This is not the hypothetical value of what Claimant 
would have earned, nor in any way approximates Claimant’s loss.  Rather, the award 
was based on disgorgement of what Hungary gained unjustly from Claimant’s 
investment.  
In dicta, the Tribunal focused on Hungary’s gain from ADC’s know-how (i.e. 
management contract).85 And on the management contract’s compensation for 
services “[t]he management fee of 3% payable in each calendar year commencing on 
and after the Operations Commencement Date … was designed in large part to 
compensate the Claimants for the services that had been rendered by the Terminal 
Manager … before the Operations Commencement Date,”86 consisting largely of 
“on–going supervision and knowledge transfer [ADC management] provided.”87  The 
management contract paid a fixed annual rate; so higher passenger volume would not 
have increased the amount Claimant received.  Indeed, the management contract was 
the piece that least supports an award of the Respondent’s disgorgement of profits, 
unless the award is intended to reflect the benefit Hungary received from “know-
how.”   These fees, however, are awarded independently of (and on top of) the 
restitution award.  Other elements, operational ones, were given a fixed percentage—
so here again, the Tribunal may have awarded a remedy exceeding the value of 
Claimant’s possible loss.88   This is not to say the Tribunal was wrong.  Just that as a 
                                                 
85 See para.149.  
86 Id. at para. 148. 
87 Id. at para. 149.   
88See Id. at para. 509 ( “The Respondent further criticises the IRR used by LECG. Schedule C to the 
Agreement establishes a target IRR of 15.4% with an upper limit of 17.5%. In the Tribunal's view, 
LECG was justified in using the upper limit. As it is shown by the Claimants and it is borne out by the 
events subsequent to the expropriation, the Budapest Airport is indeed one of the fastest growing 
airports in the world. That increase in traffic would certainly have caused an IRR superior to the 
  34
damages remedy the result is untenable.   
 The Tribunal discussed Chorzów and its applications at length.  First, the 
Tribunal recognized Chorzów’s primacy, “The customary international law standard 
for the assessment of damages resulting from an unlawful act is set out in the decision 
of the PCIJ in the Chorzów Factory.”89  The Tribunal continued, quoting Chorzów,  
“Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act 
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act 
had not been committed.”90  After using Chorzów to justify awarding a remedy other 
than the BIT mandated one, the Tribunal stated: 
The PCIJ considered that the principles to determine the amount of 
compensation for an act contrary to international law are: “Restitution 
in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to 
the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, 
of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by 
restitution in kind or payment in place of it.”  
 
The Tribunal continued with an exploration of the current role of Chorzów in 
international investment disputes.91  In its discussion it listed a wide range of ICSID 
cases, Oppenheim’s International Law, the ILC draft articles, and recent ICJ cases, all 
of which cite Chorzów as accepted customary international law.92  After its arsenal of 
                                                                                                                                           
contractual cap of 17.5%. Furthermore, the fact that the 2002 Business Plan forecast substantially 
increased projected dividends in 2010 and 2011 is due to the fact that the Project Loan was scheduled 
to be repaid by the beginning of 2009, thereby decreasing the costs of the Project Company and 
increasing the revenues that were available for distribution as dividend in 2010 and 2011”);  See also 
Id. at para. 508 (where one should note that the contract may have included a clause with “two 
alternative responses to better–than–expected Project Company performance (i.e., tariff adjustment and 
dividend waiver), which would refute my statement, but not challenge the idea that unjust enrichment 
is the underlying justification for the Tribunal’s award”). 
89 Id. at para. 484.   
90 Id.   
91 Id at. Paragraphs 487-493 
92Id. (citing S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNICTRAL (NAFTA) Award (Merits), 13 November 2000, 
para.311; Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000, 
held at paragraph 122; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Award, 
Case No. ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, the ICSID Tribunal stated in para.400; Petrobart Limited v. The 
Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitration No. 126/2003, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (Energy Charter Treaty), 29 March 2005, the Tribunal held at pages 77 and 78; R. Jennings 
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evidence, the Tribunal went on to decide that “[t]he remaining issue….What 
consequence does application of this customary international law standard have for 
the present case.…[I]t is clear that actual restitution cannot take place.”93  Thus, “[i]t 
is, in the words of the Chorzów Factory decision, ‘payment of a sum corresponding to 
the value which a restitution in kind would bear’, [on] which is the matter to be 
decided.”94   The Tribunal explained: 
 
The present case is almost unique among decided cases concerning the 
expropriation by States of foreign owned property, since the value of 
the investment after the date of expropriation (1 January 2002) has 
risen very considerably while other arbitrations that apply the Chorzów 
Factory standard all invariably involve scenarios where there has been 
a decline in the value of the investment after regulatory interference. It 
is for this reason that application of the restitution standard by various 
arbitration tribunals has led to use of the date of the expropriation as 
the date for the valuation of damages.  
However, in the present, sui generis, type of case the 
application of the Chorzów Factory standard requires that the date of 
valuation should be the date of the Award and not the date of 
expropriation, since this is what is necessary to put the Claimants in 
the same position as if the expropriation had not been committed.95 
 
Here, in response to an actual increase in value under Hungary, the Tribunal 
did not award restitution of the value of the property at the time of expropriation.  
                                                                                                                                           
and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., 1996), pages 528-529.); Amoco International 
Finance Corporation v. Iran, 15 IRAN–U.S. C.T.R. p.189 at p.246 (paras.191-194); and MTD Equity 
Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 25 May 2004, para.238.; Case 
Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung. v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) para.152; 
the LaGrand Case, (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), relied (at para.125); Case Concerning the 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, (Democratic Rep. Of Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (February 14), 
the Court again invoked (at para.76); Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals, (Mexico v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31) at paras.119-121, relied on the same principle quoted from Chorzów 
in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros, LaGrand and Arrest Warrant Judgments (and set forth in paragraph 484 
above); Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) 
93 Id. at para. 485. 
94 Id. at para. 495. 
95 Id. at para.496.   
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Rather, the Tribunal awarded the Claimant the current value of the property—
reflecting developments within Hungary and by the Hungarian government—by 
awarding restitution at the date of the award.96  The amount awarded then is the 
amount that Hungary gained through possession—or disgorgement of Respondent’s 
unjust enrichment. The unspoken theoretical basis of the Tribunal’s award became 
more apparent with the example it chooses to support its remedy:  
This kind of approach is not without support. The PCIJ in the Chorzów 
Factory case stated that damages are “not necessarily limited to the 
value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession” It is 
noteworthy that the European Court of Human Rights has applied 
Chorzów Factory in circumstances comparable to the instant case 
to compensate the expropriated party the higher value the 
property enjoyed at the moment of the Court's judgment rather 
than the considerably lesser value it had had at the earlier date of 
dispossession. 97 
The statement I bolded is both the crux of the ADC award and definitively an unjust 
enrichment award.  Indeed, invoking enjoyment by the Respondent signals a gains-
based evaluation and justification.   
 Also interesting is the case that the ADC Tribunal relied on to support their 
interpretation of Chorzów, as Papamichalopoulos clearly employs unjust 
enrichment.98  This case, however, is an ICJ takings decision, and therefore might not 
be considered persuasive for ICSID cases.  
                                                 
96 Id. at para. 497.   
97 Id. (emphasis added). 
98 Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece ((1966) E.H.R.R. 439) (available also on Westlaw at 1995 
WL 1082483 (ECHR)) at para. 36-45, “The Court ordered restitution of the land, including all of the 
buildings and other improvements made over the intervening years by the Greek Navy, and further 
(para. 39) if restitution would not be made: “[T]he Court holds that [Greece] is to pay the applicants, 
for damage and loss of enjoyment since the authorities took possession of the land in 1967, the current 
value of the land, increased by the appreciation brought about by the existence of the buildings and the 
construction costs of the latter.” Restitution would be the value of the land at the time of expropriation.  
Restitution of the current value is no longer restitution based on a claim of damages, but is now a 
gains-based award restoring Respondent’s ill-gotten gains. 
  37
The ADC Tribunal also noted the Papamichalopoulos Tribunal’s reliance on 
Chorzów’s standard for illegality. Finding that, as a consequence of illegality, 
“international case law, of courts or arbitration tribunals, affords the Court a precious 
source of inspiration.... In particular, the Permanent Court of International Justice held 
as follows in its judgment of 13 September 1928 in the case concerning the factory at 
Chorzów.”99  
The above train of thought leads one to believe that Chorzów has created a 
standard for awarding unjust enrichment for illegal takings, if the value of the 
property at issue increased significantly. The language of damages here is attached to 
a remedy that in no way approximates the loss to the Claimant, but rather assumes 
that the Respondent’s gain suffices as a proxy.   While the monetary result is merited 
in situations where the Tribunal cannot assess actual loss, the language justifying the 
result should be that of unjust enrichment rather than damages, to avoid conflating 
ideas.   
The ADC Tribunal found additional support for awarding the appreciated 
value of the Terminal in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company.100 Concluding, the 
Tribunal held:  
[I]t must assess the compensation to be paid by the Respondent to the 
Claimants in accordance with the Chorzów Factory standard, i.e., the 
Claimants should be compensated the market value of the expropriated 
investments as at the date of this Award, which the Tribunal takes as 
of September 30, 2006.101  
The Tribunal’s rather novel interpretation of the Chorzów Factory standard is not 
incorrect.  It simply relies on a relatively unexploited option in the Chorzów remedy 
menu.  What is novel is the introduction of the Chorzów unjust enrichment option into 
                                                 
99 Id. at para. 36. 
100 ADC at para. 498. 
101Id. at 499. 
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the ICSID toolkit.  
ADC’s silence regarding its reliance on unjust enrichment remains 
problematic.  Its remedy was clearly unjust enrichment, and motivating the remedy 
was some belief that Hungary did not deserve to be enriched at ADC’s expense. The 
Tribunal, however, outright rejected unjust enrichment. “Consequently, the Tribunal 
rejects the Claimants’ claim for damages under the unjust enrichment approach, 
which, in the Tribunal’s opinion, has not been substantiated by the Claimants with 
either sufficient facts or law.”102 An exploration of the DCF calculation method and 
other related calculation details directly preceded the Tribunal’s rejection of unjust 
enrichment.  There was no segue.  In fact, one wonders how the Tribunal happened 
upon this statement.   Awarding restitution of the value of the property, including 
Hungary’s added value would seem to discourage casually discarding unjust 
enrichment.  As well, when relying on restitution, a remedy based on unjust 
enrichment, the Tribunal might spend some time differentiating the two.  They are not 
the same, but are similar enough that casual disregard is problematic, especially when 
reading between the lines of the decision demonstrates the Tribunal’s reliance on 
unjust enrichment.  
In the Tribunal’s defense, the Claimant’s LECG calculations inexplicably 
resulted in markedly different amounts under the unjust enrichment approach and 
restitution approach.103  Restitution is the remedy for an unjust enrichment claim, so 
the $23 million difference was mysterious.  But it would explain the Tribunal 
rejecting the unjust enrichment calculation method.  Rejecting the elevated calculation 
measure, however, only served to further complicate the issue by creating a false 
dichotomy between restitution and unjust enrichment. Tribunals’ silence regarding 
                                                 
102 Id. at para. 500 
103 Id. 
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unjust enrichment makes awards like that of ADC awkward—as it used damage 
calculation measures and language for an award that was gains-based.  One 
unexpected negative outcome is that mixing and matching gains-based awards with 
damages can lead to duplicative awards and windfalls.  If a tribunal awards the 
claimant the gains accrued by the respondent, the claimant cannot then get the 
damages they suffered, as those damages would most likely be subsumed within the 
outlay costs necessary for the actual gains.104   
Chorzow and ADC are not alone in relying on unjust enrichment.  As 
Whiteman demonstrates in her Treatise, older cases frequently relied on unjust 
enrichment.  Later ICSID cases have done so to a lesser degree, often in a manner that 
resembles ADC’s unmeasured treatment.  Mentioning a few examples demonstrates 
that ADC and Chorzow are not alone and substantiates the claim that unjust 
enrichment is a general principle of international law.  
4.  Unjust Enrichment in ICSID 
 
  ICSID courts have touched briefly on issues of unjust enrichment. Both 
lawyers and tribunals have used unjust enrichment frivolously, thereby weakening the 
concept. I list some examples below.  The Repsol v. Ecuador Respondent used unjust 
enrichment to shame the tribunal. The “Committee was morally obligated to avoid 
any illegal and unjust enrichment.”105  In Siemens v. Argentina, Argentina used the 
                                                 
104 The Tribunal may have awarded a partially duplicative remedy, given that they awarded both the 
current value of the Claimant’s interests (including the assets’ future value) and unpaid dividends for 
the time between the expropriation and the award.  The award would only be duplicative, however, if 
Hungary used the money from the unpaid dividends to invest in increasing the Terminal’s profitability. 
Simply awarding “(a) the estimated value of the Claimant’s stake in the Project company as of the 
Award date” would allow the Company to get the profits Hungary earned (without any input costs from 
the Company), while avoiding the possibility of a duplicative award, as one might assume a good 
chunk of the payments received from dividends would have been reinvested to achieve the sort of 
growth the airport realized under Hungary. 
105 Repsol YPF Ecuador S.A. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador) ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/10 Decision on the Application for Annulment (English) (2007) at para.23.  (This appeal had 
no impact, as the annulment committee sustained the award.) 
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concept to contest compound interest saying, “this element of the Claim amounts to 
an attempt by the claimant to unjustly enrich itself in the circumstances of this 
case.”106  As well, unjust enrichment arose as a cause of action in a few cases where 
claimants tossed everything possible at the respondents.107  In these cases, arbitral 
panels were able to avoid employing unjust enrichment by relying on other, more 
traditional, causes of action. Alternatively, in Enron and Azurix, claimants invoked 
unjust enrichment as a remedial measure with no reference to respondent’s 
enrichment.108 Then in CMS, LG&E,109 AME v. Zaire,110 Southern Pacific Properties 
and others, respondents invoked the possibility of the award unjustly enriching the 
claimant as a defense to reduce damages.   In addition, cases like Inceysa v. Ecuador 
employed unjust enrichment as a successful jurisdictional defense.111 Lastly, in Santa 
Helena, the tribunal used unjust enrichment in dicta to support compound interest.112 
                                                 
106 Siemens v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 (Germany/Argentina BIT) (2007) at para.125. 
107 See Amco v. Indonesia and Saluka.   
108 Azurix Corp v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, IIC 24 (2006); Enron Corporation 
and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v The Republic of Argentina, ICSID; Decisions on Jurisdiction, 14 January 
and 2 August 2004; Award, 22 May 2007 at paras.349, 383-449. Enron suggested the unjust 
enrichment of Argentina as one measure of compensation.108 According to Enron, the unjust 
enrichment approach results in amounts for December 31, 2001, ranging from US $579,475,694 to US 
$582,018,216, depending on whether a “purchase price” or a “wealth transfer” variant is adopted.” The 
Tribunal dismissed this claim probably because claimant made no good argument for the increased 
award value under unjust enrichment. 
109 LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International, Inc. (Claimants) v Argentine Republic (Respondent) 
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2004 WL; See also Enron v. 
Argentina wherein Respondent, Argentina makes a very similar claim at para.238.  In LG& E v 
Argentina, Respondent Argentina accuses Claimant, LG&E, of attempting to unjustly enrich itself. 109 
“They are not only trying to use the Bilateral Treaty as an insurance policy against the general 
economic crisis, but also desire to enrich themselves illegitimately in such a context.”109 (LG&E 
Energy Corp and ors v. Argentina, AWARD, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 at para. 108. The Tribunal 
here was sympathetic, forgiving Argentina for some of the loss on “state of necessity” grounds.109 
(para. 33-53; 59-62; and 90-98. 
110 American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. (Claimant) v Republic of Zaire (Respondent) ICSID Case 
No. ARB/93/1 (1997). at para. 7.15. The Tribunal uses unjust enrichment as a mitigating factor that 
“should be taken into account in the event that any compensation is awarded in this case.”110 
111 In Inceysa v El Salvador,111 El Salvador used local courts to get out of a contract.  The other party, 
Inceysa sued under ICSID for enforcement or compensation.  The Tribunal denied jurisdiction on 
grounds of unjust enrichment to Claimant if the contract were performed.  Claimant, Inceysa, 
defrauded El Salvador to obtain the contract, and thus any enrichment was unjust. Specifically, the 
Tribunal found: “The acts committed by Inceysa during the bidding process are in violation of the legal 
principle that prohibits unlawful enrichment. The written legal systems of the nations governed by the 
Civil Law system recognize that, when the cause of the increase in the assets of a certain person is 
illegal, such enrichment must be sanctioned by preventing its consummation. Applying the principle 
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This list does not even begin to address the more subtle case-specific 
differences.  Nor does the list highlight the lack of evidence and argument, which 
lawyers in these cases presented (or failed to present).  As well, the list does not do 
justice to the off-handed dismissals (sometimes warranted, sometimes not), the 
implicit reliance, and the misuse of the concept by both tribunals and lawyers.  
Indeed, the indiscriminate and unclear use of unjust enrichment by all parties 
undermines the integrity of what could be a useful and fair tool in international 
arbitration.    
Some ICSID tribunals, however, have explored unjust enrichment in a 
productive manner.  In these cases, the lawyers often failed to make a strong case.  
Still, these cases merit examination, as they may guide future applications of unjust 
enrichment.  As well, they demonstrate that even though there has been some 
disappointing treatment of unjust enrichment, it has not been written off entirely.  In 
addition, it is of interest that ICSID tribunals nearly always use the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal definition of unjust enrichment.  This means that although the tribunals and 
lawyers have been all over the map, there is some consensus as to the correct 
application of unjust enrichment.  
a) Saluka (Cause of Action) 
 
Saluka v. The Czech Republic113 represents one of the few instances where a 
Claimant (Saluka) in an ICSID case employed unjust enrichment as a cause of action 
                                                                                                                                           
discussed above to the case at hand, we note that Inceysa resorted to fraud to obtain a benefit that it 
would not have otherwise obtained.”  
112 Santa Helena v. Costa Rica at para.103. The tribunal used unjust enrichment in dicta to justify 
awarding compound interest. 112 In discussing appropriate damages the Santa Helena Tribunal states 
“the taking state is not entitled unjustly to enrich itself by reason of the fact that the payment of 
compensation has been long delayed.”112   
 
113 Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Judgment of the Swiss Tribunal (German), 7 
September 2006 
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(albeit subsidiary) under a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”).  Saluka contended that 
the Czech Republic violated BIT Article 3’s “fair and equitable treatment” clause by  
“fail[ing] to prevent the unjust enrichment of CSOB at the expense of the IPB 
shareholders, including Saluka, upon the transfer of IPB's business to CSOB and the 
aforementioned State aid following the forced administration.”114  
  The Tribunal rejected Saluka’s argument, stating first that “[t]he concept of 
unjust enrichment is recognized as a general principle of international law.”115  The 
Tribunal continued, quoting the unjust enrichment tenets from the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal to frame the discussion.116 
Proceeding, the Tribunal highlighted a key ambiguity, whose interpretation 
will dictate the future of unjust enrichment claims under BITs.  The question, which 
the Tribunal put forth, but did not answer, was, “[i]f it is assumed that the “fair and 
equitable treatment” standard also includes the general principle of unjust enrichment, 
[then] an investor would therefore also be protected by this standard against unjust 
enrichment by the host State.”117 
The Tribunal left its own threshold question unanswered, instead invalidating 
the claim on the grounds that “there was no enrichment of the Respondent to the 
detriment of the Claimant.”118  Specifically,    
[i]n the case before the Tribunal, the question would be whether the 
Czech State has, by means of the transfer of IPB's business to CSOB 
and the provision of the aforementioned State aid following the forced 
administration, taken or received anything of value at the expense of 
                                                 
114 Id. at para. 310 
115 Id. at para.449 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at para.450. [emphasis added] 
118 Id. 
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Saluka. For the reasons set out below, the Tribunal would answer this 
question in the negative.119 
The Tribunal began by maintaining that actions that enrich a company cannot be 
considered to enrich a shareholder.120  Following, the Tribunal drew a conclusion that 
may dissuade investors from making unjust enrichment claims, namely that:  
it was IPB's and not the Claimant's banking business that was 
transferred to CSOB. IPB's assets were owned by IPB itself, not by its 
shareholders. Again, the concept of the separateness of the company 
from its shareholders prevents the Tribunal from equating IPB and 
Saluka. Consequently, CSOB did not receive anything at the expense 
of Saluka.121 
This was a particularly odd argument given that in cases like Enron v. Argentina, 
shareholders were awarded damages for expropriation owing to lost share value.122   
Subsequently, the Tribunal rejected Claimant’s argument that  “for the Czech 
Republic to become liable towards Saluka it is sufficient to establish that the Czech 
Republic actively participated in a conspiracy to enrich one private party at the 
expense of another by using regulatory powers to effect an illegal transfer of 
ownership in IPB's business.”123  Finding the argument “legally not well founded,”124 
the Tribunal went on to explain that “[i]t stretches the principle of unjust enrichment 
beyond its proper scope.”125 In delimiting the scope of unjust enrichment the Tribunal 
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at para. 452 
121 Id. at para.453. 
122 See Enron v. Argentina… 
123 Id. at para. 454. 
124 Id. at para.455. 
125 Id. 
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said,  “The notion of one party being an accessory to an unjustified transfer between 
two other parties is not part of the concept of unjust enrichment.126 
This was a valid interpretation of unjust enrichment parameters, as the State 
must be enriched at the expense of the Claimant.  This argument did not, however, 
adequately address the issues presented in the surrounding statements.  In this last 
statement, the Tribunal distinguished expropriation from unjust enrichment.  As 
explored below, there is substantial overlap between unjust enrichment and 
expropriation.  This differentiation is one of a few key differences that make investors 
prefer expropriation to unjust enrichment when choosing causes of action (the others 
being a better assortment of damages and a set of specific rules outlining 
expropriation). 
Also of interest in Saluka are the sources the Tribunal cited.  Consistent with 
almost all tribunals following its publication, they cited Schreurer’s Unjustified 
Enrichment in International Law as evidence that unjust enrichment is a general 
principle of international law.127  They also referenced the Lena Goldfields 
litigation.128  And, in defining unjust enrichment, they relied on Benjamin Isaiah v. 
Bank Mellat from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.129   
The Saluka monetary award is currently unavailable.  It will be interesting to 
see if they rely on restitution and unjust enrichment principles in their calculations.  
b) Azurix v. Argentina (Remedy) 
 
                                                 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at footnote 50. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at footnote 51.  
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In Azurix v Argentina, the claimant, Azurix, requested that compensation be 
based on “unjust enrichment.”130  Azurix provided the Tribunal with a variety of 
compensation methods without preference, and the value each would yield.  First was 
the “actual investment” method, at $449 million when it acquired the Concession plus 
$102.4 million in additional capital contributions to ABA, and $15 million in 
consequential costs.  Second was the “book value” method, which provided $516.9, 
$484.6, $483.9, or $482.2 million, depending on the date.  Lastly, Claimant Azurix 
asked for, “unjust enrichment - on the benefits received by the Province. On this 
basis, the Province was enriched by the Canon, the further investment of $102.4 
million, and the time value - interest - of the funds. In the case of the Canon, Azurix 
submits that in accordance with the NERA report, the consideration of the time value 
would raise it to $450.5.”131   
Here the claimant misused unjust enrichment, as they failed to substantiate the 
value that Argentina received from the funds at any point in the case. The value 
Argentina received would be based on the form of the funds and what Argentina did 
with those funds, rather than the amount of money thrown at a State company.  The 
claimant’s oversight enabled the Tribunal to easily dismiss the claim, first 
distinguishing damages from unjust enrichment: 
As to compensation on account of an unlawful act, it is based on the 
loss suffered, while, in the case of unjust enrichment, it is based on 
restitution: for instance, what can be claimed, at least under some civil 
law regimes, is restitution of the lower of the amount contributed by 
the impoverished or the gain made by the enriched.132  
                                                 
130 Azirux v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (2006) at para. 411.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 436.  
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The Tribunal’s statement might imply that unjust enrichment, and thus restitution, can 
be employed only in isolation—or as in some countries’ legal codes, where no other 
cause of action can be brought.  This is reflected in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.  
The Tribunal, however, was more likely referring to causes of action under unjust 
enrichment, which do only allow restitution.  In cases for wrongs, restitution is one of 
many available measurements for damages.  
Of interest is the Tribunal’s reference to civil law regimes’ limitation on 
restitution for unjust enrichment—it must be the minimum amount given, as it is “the 
lower amount contributed by the impoverished or the gain made by the enriched.” 133 
If this principle applies internationally, investors will only want to employ unjust 
enrichment damages where no other damages are available, as unjust enrichment will 
always, by law, be the smallest award.   
Also useful is the court’s recycling of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal definition 
invoked by Amco v. Indonesia.134  This may signal the beginning of universal 
parameters (customary international law?) and acknowledgement of the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal as a source of expertise.   “The Iran-US Tribunal, which has dealt 
with claims based on the principle of unjust enrichment on several occasions, defined 
the principle of unjust enrichment and its applicability as follows....”135 
After perhaps the most thoughtful and holistic discussion of unjust enrichment 
in an ICSID tribunal, the arbitrators offhandedly dismissed unjust enrichment.136 The 
dismissal probably reflected the Claimant’s failure to argue the case in terms of 
enrichment.  The Tribunal instead awarded the claimant $165,240,753 dollars plus 
compound interest based on the actual value of the investment.  Of the $165 million, 
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$60 million was from the fair market value of the initial investment, and $102 million 
was from additional capital contributions.  Interestingly, the $60 million was only a 
fraction of Azurix’s initial investment, which it calculated at around $450 million.  
The amount was reduced because “no well-informed investor…would have paid for 
the Concession the price…paid by Azurix.”137  The Tribunal qualified this statement, 
however, “[T]he Province accepted the price paid by Azurix…and benefited from the 
alleged aggressive price paid.”  It repeats this a paragraph later.  “The Tribunal cannot 
ignore the fact that…the Province benefited from the alleged aggressive price 
paid.”138  While this was mentioned in the paragraph just before awarding the $60 
million, it is unclear how the Tribunal factored in the Province’s benefit.  All we 
know is that they did, and therefore it smacks of unjust enrichment.   
Azurix was one of the first ICSID tribunals to explicitly explore unjust 
enrichment as a compensation tool. Earlier cases, like Guinea v. Maritime 
(SOTRAMAR) Annulment,139 demonstrate implicit reliance, and acceptance of unjust 
enrichment as a principle of international law.  
c) Guinea v. Maritime 
 
 The Guinea v. Maritime proceedings provide an interesting, if confusing, 
portrayal of unjust enrichment principles.  In partially annulling the award, the Ad hoc 
Committee blamed the Tribunal’s failure to state reasons for its damages calculation.  
The Committee “finds that to the extent that the Tribunal purported to state the 
reasons for its decision, they were inconsistent and in contradiction with its analysis 
of damages theories.”140  Specifically, the Committee contended that:  
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the damages calculation by the Tribunal [does] not purport to estimate 
profits that SOTRAMAR (Claimant’s company) would have made, but 
rather take as a base either the actual or hypothesized profits under the 
substitute Afrobulk/Guinomar arrangements. The theory underlying 
this approach, which was not articulated either by the parties or by the 
Tribunal, may have been that for Guinea to keep the fruits of the 
substitute arrangements, which according to the Tribunal's ruling on 
breach of contract it had concluded in violation of the Agreement, 
would have constituted unjust enrichment, and that MINE should 
therefore be awarded the same share of those profits as it was entitled 
to receive if they had been SOTRAMAR profits.141 
Here, the original Tribunal, which for various reasons did not want to mention unjust 
enrichment, employed unjust enrichment both to legitimize and determine damages.  
Using the gains Guinea received from its new royalty agreement to estimate damages 
meant that the amount Guinea received (or was enriched) were what MINE was 
awarded.  
The Tribunal finds that MINE's loss of profits may be measured adequately by 
the afrobulk agreement: the 50 cents per ton which Guinea received from 
afrobulk for the right to carry bauxite under Art. 9 during a two-year period 
rightfully belongs to SOTRAMAR. In addition, it seems fair to conclude that 
such an arrangement could have been extended, or negotiated with others, to a 
total period of 10 years … The quantity of bauxite carried during the 10-year 
period under such an arrangement is 38,437,127 tons; and this tonnage, 
multiplied by 50 cents per ton, produces the total due SOTRAMAR of 
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$19,218,563. Under Art. 9(B) of the Convention, SOTRAMAR's net profits 
were to be taxed 30% by Guinea, and the remaining 70% was to be divided 
equally between MINE and Guinea. Therefore MINE is entitled to 35% of the 
total, producing the principal sum of $6,726,497.142 
The original award, shown above, was restitution of ill-gotten gains.  The 
Committee annulled it simply because the Tribunal had not justified their award.  
Notice that the Committee did not question employing unjust enrichment as 
justification, only its undisclosed use.  Thus, had the Tribunal employed unjust 
enrichment explicitly, rather than simply discarding other options and calculating an 
award using no legal explanation, they may not have been overruled.   
d) Conclusion  
 
These cases show that ICSID tribunals do entertain the notion that unjust 
enrichment is a general principle of international law. ICSID cases are complex both 
because they rely on BITs and because they are not purely contractual or off-contract 
cases.  Rather they combine tort law, property law, contract law, and frustrated 
contracts.  Thus, if anything ICSID cases need off-contract remedies.  Non-ICSID 
cases involving international business and frustrated contracts demonstrate the utility 
of unjust enrichment for international investment, relying on unjust enrichment 
through rules like the Vienna Convention CISG.143  
While an entryway remains for unjust enrichment as a cause of action and a 
measure of damages, ICSID cases have not employed it.  Again, expropriation’s 
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primacy, unjust enrichment’s complex prerequisites, and unjust enrichment’s 
exclusivity may be explanatory.144  Also, the inherently moral nature of unjust 
enrichment decision may dissuade judges.  Regardless, even in ICSID, the door is 
open—and one might see a claim with speculative losses employ unjust enrichment to 
calculate damages.145  
The Iran-U.S. tribunal also dealt with investment disputes, and effectively 
incorporated unjust enrichment.   Indeed, as later ICSID cases demonstrate when 
citing Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal parameters, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cemented 
universal parameters. Standardization prevented the cherry picking that equitable 
concepts can introduce.   If anything, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal shows the 
effectiveness of considered application of unjust enrichment, and underscores the 
error of ICSID tribunals’ sloppy dismissals.   Exploring the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
case law introduces the universal parameters for unjust enrichment in international 
investment disputes.  
 
5. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
 
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal kicked off in the wake of the 1979-1981 
hostage crisis.  The Tribunal aimed to settle contract, property, and debt claims of 
U.S. nationals against Iran and vice versa, as well as contractual disputes between the 
two states.   The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is a mixed tribunal, composed of nine 
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judges: three Iranian, three American, and three others.  While the Tribunal relies on 
international law, they employ Iranian and U.S. law to fill voids.146  
The Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal solidified and fleshed out unjust enrichment as 
a cause of action in the international arena.147 If Professor Kull’s argument that unjust 
enrichment and restitution are inseparable is convincing, then the distinction was 
merely semantic, and this is irrelevant. That said, a practical framework for allowing 
unjust enrichment as a cause of action is vital in limiting abuse.  The Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal was very careful in creating boundaries for its application.  As mentioned 
above, Bank Isaiah laid out five prerequisites and later cases elaborated on them, fine-
tuning and ultimately creating a solid set of transplantable unjust enrichment 
parameters.  For example, in Sea-Land: 
The Tribunal set unjust enrichment apart from other remedies which 
could independently found a cause of action. Thus it stated: 
There must have been an enrichment of one party to the 
detriment of the other, and both must arise as a consequence of 
the same act or event.  There must be no justification for the 
enrichment and no contractual or other remedy available to 
the injured party whereby he might seek compensation from the 
party enriched.148  
According to Wayne Mapp, 
                                                 
146 Mapp, Wayne, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: The First Ten Years, 1981-1991, 
Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1993. 
147 Unlike western legal systems, Shari’ah law does not embrace the concept of interest.  Interest is 
money made without work.  Shari’ah law forbids money made thus (See supra). The resurgence of 
Shari’ah law in Muslim countries complicates international business transactions—particularly given 
this concept. In fact, Iran-US Tribunal’s acceptance of unjust enrichment claims might be motivated by 
their need to balance international with national laws.  Balancing U.S. common law with Iranian 
Shari’ah law may have demanded creativity and reliance on less common general principles—such as 
unjust enrichment.       
 
148 Id. at 168 
  52
The Sea-Land claim also included expropriation as a cause of action, 
and apart from the duty to compensate, expropriation is not necessarily 
a breach of international law.  Although there is a close relationship 
between causes of action founded on expropriation and unjust 
enrichment they have been perceived by the Tribunal as quite separate.  
Thus the Tribunal has awarded compensation to claimants if the 
respondent state has been enriched at the expense of the claimant, 
whether or not the respondent state has committed any act of 
expropriation.149  
Practically, this means that for ICSID and other international investment disputes, an 
unjust enrichment claim would only occur where no expropriation claim is possible.  
Expropriation claims are well defined, explicitly endorsed causes of action, whereas 
unjust enrichment remains unclear.  Expropriation’s primacy may explain unjust 
enrichment’s relatively slim role, as a case would only be brought where the state was 
enriched without expropriation. Unjust enrichment’s utility is further limited by 
inherent requirements such as direct causation between loss and gain, the exclusion of 
other remedies and causes of action, and policy pitfalls. The concept of unjust 
enrichment, however, underlies many expropriation claims.  
 What distinguishes unjust enrichment claims from expropriation, then, is 
probably the nature of the respondent State’s gain, as well as the type of property the 
claimant possessed.  It is unclear whether intellectual property can be expropriated.  If 
so, then in some intellectual property cases, property rights may be established where 
there is a patent or copyright, allowing for expropriation.  In other cases, know-how 
or other benefits may not have a legal property right attached, so unjust enrichment 
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would be the only cause of action, as unjust enrichment requires no illegal action. If 
intellectual property cannot be expropriated, then all intellectual property disputes 
must be brought as unjust enrichment claims. As will be explored in Section III, using 
unjust enrichment as a cause of action will allow the Claimant to get through 
jurisdictional thresholds where expropriation may not.  And, unjust enrichment claims 
are not limited to restitution at the time of the taking, unlike most BIT remedies for 
legal expropriation. 
Moving on, Lockheed Corporation v. Iran150 confirmed earlier decisions 
forbidding unjust enrichment where a contract existed.151 
First, as the Tribunal has held in other cases, the claimant must 
establish that there is no valid and enforceable contract on which an 
action for damages could be based. Secondly, the claimant must 
establish that the respondent has been enriched at the claimant’s 
expense, the extent of such enrichment and that it would be unfair for 
the respondent not to pay for the benefits it has received.152   
Mapp adds: 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action 
has been progressively developed by the Tribunal … The Schlegel 
Corporation v National Iranian Copper Industries Company153… 
observed that the rule against unjust enrichment represents a principle 
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based on justice and equity and therefore makes it necessary to take 
into account all the circumstances of each specific situation.154 
In sum, unjust enrichment claims can only be made where there is no claim for 
expropriation and no contract, and where the five prerequisites are met.   
In addition to setting clear parameters for bringing unjust enrichment claims, 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases by default explore unjust enrichment award 
calculations.  These calculations vary significantly according to the factual 
circumstances of the case. As well, there is general judicial debate over correct 
computation.  The Tribunal in Sea-Land pointed out that “[o]pinions differ as to the 
basis of computation of damages. The predominant view seems to be that damages 
should be assessed to reflect the extent by which the state has been enriched. Judge 
Jimenez de Arechaga considers that where the ‘enriched’ state has obtained no 
benefit, no compensation should be payable at all."155 This limits both where unjust 
enrichment is applicable and the amount awarded.  The Sea-Land Tribunal continued 
exploring award calculations, stating: 
Equity clearly requires that cognizance be taken of the defacto situation, 
and this explains why there is no discernible uniformity in the practice of 
international tribunals in this respect. Important factual circumstances to 
be taken into account are the level of investment; the period during which 
the foreign investor has been able to make a profit; and the benefit actually 
derived by the host country from its acquisition.156 
Applying these considerations to the Sea-Land facts, the Tribunal held:  
Compensation for unjust enrichment cannot encompass damages for loss 
of future profits. The Tribunal must aim instead to place a monetary value 
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on the extent to which PSO [Iranian Ports and Shipping Organization] was 
enriched by its premature acquisition of the facility… The Tribunal must 
establish whether PSO did in fact avail itself of the facility after Sea-
Land's departure. PSO in its Statement of Defence denies having used the 
installations and facilities at the terminal but there is some evidence that it 
did make use of them.157  
The Tribunal here estimated that premature use of the Sea-Land facility enriched the 
PSO by approximately $750,000.00.158  This figure comes from the Tribunal’s 
projected gain—based on PSO documents discussing what PSO could have gained 
during the 611-day period that Sea-Land remained unexploited (which the Tribunal 
used to estimate the profits that occurred when PSO later began exploitation), coupled 
with documents showing that there was in fact a subsequent exploitation.159   
The Sea-Land Tribunal, however, didn’t allow recovery for lost moveable 
property in the instant case.  The Sea-Land Tribunal explained: 
[u]njust enrichment requires that Sea-Land be compensated for those items 
and assets left in Iran of which PSO or the Government obtained the use and 
benefit. It does not permit the Tribunal to compensate Sea-Land for the loss of 
unpaid debts, freight charges, and termination expenses, none of which 
resulted in the enrichment of PSO or the Government.160 
And, in this case, the Tribunal found no evidence that Iran had used the property left 
by Sea-Land.  Compensation for garage inventory and other equipment was similarly 
denied.161    
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The Tribunal concluded that “[t]he Ports and Shipping Organization [PSO] is 
obligated to pay Sea-Land Service, Inc. Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand United States 
Dollars (US $750,000.00).”  This award reflected only the value of the estimated 
early use of the property, and did not give any money for lost equipment or lost future 
profits. 
 In contrast, the Schlegel tribunal based its award on quantum meruit.   Here, 
Schlegel was a subcontractor.  Schlegel wanted to be paid for building a reservoir 
lining for the Copper Company, with whom it had no contract because Schlegel’s 
contract was between Schlegel and another contractor. Because no contract existed 
between the Copper Company and Schlegel, the case was considered off-contract, 
allowing for an unjust enrichment claim:162  
When Schlegel had performed its work, the result was that the Copper 
Company had acquired a reservoir lining to its specifications provided by a 
company it had effectively nominated to do work supervised and approved by 
its own engineers…The Tribunal finds that the enrichment was and remains 
unjust. The evidence is clear that the Copper Company has never paid the 
balance due for Schlegel's work. Nor is there any doubt, given Binnie's 
issuance of the Maintenance Certificate, that Schlegel's work had been 
satisfactorily completed … The Tribunal concludes under the circumstances 
that, once the work had been completed by the sub-contractor Schlegel, and it 
had for good and valid reasons appealed to the Copper Company for payment 
directly, it was manifestly unjust for the Copper Company to deny payment to 
Schlegel under Article 59(2), particularly when it would not have incurred any 
loss to itself by doing so. The Tribunal holds, consequently, that the Copper 
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Company has been unjustly enriched and must therefore pay Schlegel the 
balance due of 12,934,124 rials.163 
Here the Tribunal awarded the balance owed Schlegel for their work plus 10.5% 
interest per annum.164  This award resembles a damages award, given that Schlegel 
received what was owed them in their contract. Like many quantum meruit cases, the 
Tribunal based the value of the labor on the price fixed by the contract.  So that, even 
though the award resembled damages, it was calculated on the value to the 
respondent, which just happened to equal the amount owed the claimant. This 
distinction is important because in the second instance (restitution), if the Copper 
Company never used the reservoir, then there would be no award.  
 In Benjamin Isaiah, the claimant sued for $380,000.  Bank Mellat was holding 
the money and refused to turn it over to him.  Here, “the Tribunal believes that it 
would be inequitable for such a bank to be able to escape liability to the beneficial 
owner of the funds represented by such a dishonored check and retain the funds to 
which the bank has no claim.”165  Consequently, “the Tribunal holds that the 
Respondent Bank Mellat has wrongfully detained Mr. Isaiah's $380,000 since 10 
January 1979 and that Isaiah is entitled to an award in that amount.”166  The Tribunal, 
however, declined to award interest: 
The award of interest is certainly permissible in the discretion of the Tribunal. 
In this case there is no evidence that the International Bank of Iran or its 
successor, Bank Mellat, deliberately deprived the Claimant of his money; on 
the contrary, the evidence indicates that the Bank made unsuccessful efforts to 
restore its credit facilities with Chase Manhattan Bank so that the check could 
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be paid. In view of the special circumstances in this case, the Tribunal declines 
to award interest.167 
All of these cases present facts demanding different award calculations for unjust 
enrichment.  Each tailors the award to fit the facts of the case.  Benjamin Isaiah 
simply got his money back.  Schlegel received the value of their labor, which had 
been done expressly for the benefit of Copper Company.  And, in Sea-Land, the 
Tribunal approximated the value that PSO got from prematurely occupying a facility. 
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal set out clear tenets for unjust enrichment as a 
cause of action.  The most important tenet is that unjust enrichment can only be 
brought where no other cause of action is available.  Thus, Claimants cannot bypass 
contracts to get better results through an off-contract cause of action.  This both 
protects the integrity of the contract and confines unjust enrichment claims. 
In addition, unjust enrichment claims house internal restrictions.  By law 
unjust enrichment claims only get restitution (monetary or otherwise).  Restitution 
occurs only where the respondent actually gained something, and thus, the respondent 
will never pay more than they have profited, unlike damages claims.  This ensures 
that the remedy corresponds to the violation.  If the violation is not necessarily illegal, 
a damages award might deliver unjust results.   
ICSID tribunals should employ the detailed parameters set out by the Iran-
U.S. Claims tribunal. Some additional issues, however, require addressing. First, is 
unjust enrichment an acceptable cause of action under ICSID?  If so, how would one 
bring it and what barriers need to be confronted? Lastly, what are the tenets of unjust 
enrichment within ICSID cases? 
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III.  HYPOTHETICALS: UNJUST ENRICHMENT APPLIED 
 
In my view, a small subset of cases would benefit from unjust enrichment 
claims—cases that otherwise might not get jurisdiction or where damages would not 
appropriately redress the grievance.  In this Part, I refer specifically to off-contract 
intellectual property disputes, where the value of the Respondent country’s benefit 
exceeds Claimant’s loss.    
A successful claim must meet ICSID jurisdictional requirements.  Thus, a 
claimant must show:  
(i) that there was a dispute; 
(ii) that the dispute was a legal one; 
(iii) that the dispute arises directly and not indirectly out of an investment; 
and 
(iv) that there was an investment out of which a legal dispute has directly 
arisen.168 
A successful claim under unjust enrichment takes the following form.  First, 
there must a dispute.  Easy enough.  Second, the dispute must be legal.  As explored 
below, this requires finding a clause in the BIT that the respondent violated.   Here, I 
argue that the applicable clause is the “fair and equitable treatment standard.”  The 
“fair and equitable treatment standard” requires that signatory nations not violate 
customary international law with respect to investors from contracting states.  If 
unjust enrichment is part of customary international law, then it is protected under the 
fair and equitable treatment standard.  This requires two steps: (1) Claimant must 
show that unjust enrichment is a part of customary international law, and (2) Claimant 
must show that unjust enrichment, as understood by international law, occurred.  
Thus, the Claimant must have a case that fulfills the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal tenets 
for unjust enrichment.  So,  
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 (1) There must an enrichment; 
(2) With a corresponding loss; 
(3) Close causal connection between the loss and the enrichment; 
(4) No justification for the enrichment; and, 
(5) No other cause of action available (thus, if you have a contract claim, you 
cannot rely on unjust enrichment, and unjust enrichment can only be brought 
in isolation).169 
In addition to just being good law, these parameters serve to weed out frivolous cases, 
contractual cases, and cases that might fall under another BIT standard.  This makes 
unjust enrichment a cause of action and remedy for those who would otherwise have 
no voice, because they only occur where “no other cause of action is available.”  
           Fulfilling the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal parameters for unjust enrichment 
claims has the secondary benefit of ensuring that the larger claim meets most of 
ICSID’s jurisdictional requirements. The requirements that the respondent state “be 
enriched” and that there be a “close causal connection between the loss and the 
enrichment,” dovetail with ICSID jurisdictional requirements.  Namely, that “the 
dispute arises directly and not indirectly out of an investment;” and that there be “an 
investment out of which a legal dispute has directly arisen.”   
               As well, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal unjust enrichment requirement that 
there be a “corresponding loss” addresses a concern particular to NAFTA.  NAFTA 
Article 1116: Claim by an Investor of a Party on Its Own Behalf, states that: “An 
investor of a Party may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that another 
Party has breached an obligation under: …and that the investor has incurred loss or 
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damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.”170  Here, NAFTA requires that 
the investor “incur loss or damage” to bring a claim. Put simply, this NAFTA 
requirement is satisfied because it is intrinsic to unjust enrichment, as a valid claim 
requires that the investor suffer a “corresponding loss.” 
           Having met all four jurisdictional requirements for ICSID and assuming a 
victory on the merits, only the remedy remains. Even though “fair and equitable 
treatment” violations give a great deal of judicial discretion relative to remedies, I 
argue that unjust enrichment claims should only receive restitution/unjust enrichment.  
This is because, as I explore above, the two are inseparable.  The entire unjust 
enrichment claim is spent proving an enrichment to the other party, of which you 
deserve a part.  Thus, asking to be compensated for loss would be unsubstantiated and 
inapt. In many ways, bringing a claim for unjust enrichment under the umbrella of 
“fair and equitable treatment,” is the same as asking for unjust enrichment as a 
remedy. As well, part of what makes unjust enrichment fair is that the claimant can 
only get compensated based on what the Respondent gained, so countries will not be 
forced to pay out money they never had.  
The argument outlined above is explored in detail below. To illustrate how the 
limitations listed above and others will interact with ICSID requirements, I present a 
series of hypotheticals based on Mihaly.171  
A. MIHALY 
 
In the case itself, Claimant, Mihaly International Corporation, sued Sri Lanka 
under the United States-Sri Lanka BIT.  Mihaly wanted compensation for its pre-
contractual investment, made during negotiations for a Build Operate Transfer 
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(“BOT”) concession to build a new power plant.  In 1992, Sri Lanka solicited bids for 
the project, eventually selecting the Claimant. During the negotiations Claimant 
engaged in extensive planning and projections including the plant design and financial 
projections.172  Mihaly claimed that some two to four percent of the $400 million 
projected to build the power plant were spent in designing and planning the plant.173  
Negotiations failed after a few years, and no contract was signed.174   
Mihaly sued under the BIT, for a violation of “fair and equitable” treatment 
because it was never compensated for its pre-contractual expenditures, which it 
considered an investment.  The Tribunal, however, found that pre-contractual 
expenses are not an “investment” protected by the BIT, as defined by the Washington 
Convention.175 Since Sri Lanka never signed a contract, they never agreed to ICSID 
jurisdiction. “The operation of SAEC was contingent upon the final conclusion of the 
contract with Sri Lanka, thus the expenditures for its creation would not be regarded 
as an investment until admitted by Sri Lanka.”176  
Unjust enrichment is inapplicable in the actual Mihaly case, as Sri Lanka 
didn’t benefit from Mihaly’s plans. If, however, Sri Lanka had used the power plant 
plans to create a power plant, then, Mihaly would have an excellent cause of action 
under unjust enrichment.  And, unlike awarding pre-contractual damages, which 
would open the floodgates for a new array of lawsuits, unjust enrichment claims bring 
with them inherent limitations.   
B. MIHALY 1 
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Assume, then, that all the Mihaly case facts remain, save one. In the new 
Mihaly, “Mihaly 1,” Sri Lanka used Mihaly 1’s plans to build the power plant —
without compensation. The substantive case is as follows.   
Sri Lanka was unjustly enriched at the expense of Mihaly 1 because Sri Lanka 
benefited from Mihaly 1’s property without compensation. Mihaly 1 suffered a 
corresponding loss of both potential profits from the plant and more importantly from 
the two to four percent costs of their uncompensated outlay in creating the plan. In 
addition, there was significant causal connection between Mihaly 1’s loss and Sri 
Lanka’s gain, as Sri Lanka was able to use Mihaly 1’s work and outlay to create a 
power plant benefiting Sri Lanka.  As well, given the facts of Mihaly, none of the 
defenses apply (illegal activity, duress, etc.), since Sri Lanka had a public bid for the 
project.  Lastly, Claimant has no other cause of action, as the claim was not based on 
a contract, and was not illegal.  
While the substantive claim, based on the merits, seems relatively simple, the 
threshold jurisdictional barriers in ICSID present substantial complications.  In 
addition to proving the claim on its merits, Mihaly 1 must show that its pre-
contractual expenses— because they led to an unjust enrichment for Sri Lanka—are 
considered an investment under the BIT and that there is a valid legal dispute, 
meaning that unjust enrichment violates one of the BIT provisions.  
 Jurisdiction presents a series of obstacles, one of which is inconsistency.  
Arbitral panels are still debating whether BITs’ lex specialis trumps the Washington 
Convention, or vice versa—so jurisdictional thresholds must be examined under both 
interpretations.  In many instances where two overlap or one is silent, they can be 
considered as a unitary threshold for jurisdiction.     
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The Washington Convention, Article 25 states that “[t]he jurisdiction of the 
Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between 
a Contracting State … and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties 
to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.”177  The original Mihaly 
Tribunal found that Mihaly was “a national of another Contracting state” and 
therefore the only relevant jurisdictional issue is ratione materie [underlined 
above].178 To get jurisdiction ratione materie (subject matter jurisdiction), Claimant 
must show:  
(i) that there was a dispute; 
(ii) that the dispute was a legal one; 
(iii) that the dispute arises directly and not indirectly out of an 
investment; and 





In exploring jurisdiction, I begin by fulfilling the Washington Convention Article 25 
requirements listed above, then move to BIT specific requirements, and lastly to the 
fair and equitable treatment standard.   
a) Washington Convention Requirements: (iv) Investment 
 
Establishing that an “investment” occurred was the crux of the original Mihaly 
case: 
The most crucial and controversial contentions of the Parties were 
concentrated upon the existence vel non of an “investment”…A 
                                                 
177 Id. at para. 28. 
178 Id at para. 25-27. 
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  65
fortiorissime, without proof of an “investment” under Article 25(1), 
neither Party need to argue further, for without such an investment, 
there can be no dispute, legal or otherwise, arising directly out of it, 
which could be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Centre and the 
Tribunal.180  
As was discussed above, the fact that the Tribunal didn’t consider a pre-contractual 
expense with no benefit an “investment” motivated the Tribunal’s refusal to give 
Mihaly jurisdiction.  In Mihaly 1, however, Sri Lanka benefiting unjustly from the 
pre-contractual expense transforms the nature of the claim to include the requisite 
“investment.”  The Washington Convention lets the parties determine what constitutes 
an “investment,” leading to amorphous requirements.181   
The Tribunal in Helman International Hotels A/S v. Egypt states that “to be 
characterized as an investment a project ‘must show a certain duration, a regularity of 
profit and return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment, and a significant 
contribution to the host State’s development.’”182  Patrick Mitchell provides a more 
nuanced reading of these requirements:183   
There are four characteristics of investment identified by ICSID case 
law184 and commented on by legal doctrine, but in reality they are 
interdependent and are consequently examined comprehensively.  The 
first characteristic of investment is the commitment of the investor, 
which may be financial or through work, indeed, in several ICSID 
                                                 
180 Id. at para. 32. 
181 This means that many scholars think that BIT definitions of investment govern.  The Mihaly tribunal 
thought otherwise, as will be explored later. 
182 Helnan International Hotels A/S v Egypt, Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction, 
ICSID Case No ARB/05/19, IIC 130 (2006) at para. 77.  
183 Mitchell v Congo, the Democratic Republic of the, Decision on Application of Annulment of 
Award, ICSID Case No ARB/99/7, IIC 172 (2006). 
184Id. at para. 27 (referring to  Fedax N.V v. Republic of Venezuala (Case No. ARB/96/3), Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, July 11, 1997, 5 ICSID Rep. 186 (2002)’ CSOB v. Slovak Republic (Case 
No. ARB/97/4); Salini Constrittori S.p.A. and Italistrade S.p.A v. Kingdon of Morocco (Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Deicsion on Jurisdiction, Jluly 23, 2001). 
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cases the investor’s commitment mainly consisted in [sic] its know-
how.185  
The Mitchell Tribunal’s broad reference to “know-how” and flexible reading of the 
four investment characteristics, provides an opening for unjust enrichment claims in 
cases where the BIT does not explicitly recognize intellectual property, and/or where 
the intellectual property rights were not patented.  
The Mitchell Tribunal continues: 
Other characteristics of investment are the duration of the project and 
the economic risk entailed, in the sense of an uncertainty regarding its 
successful outcome.  The fourth characteristic of investment is the 
contribution to the economic development of the host country.186 
Note that the location of the investment and the amount actually invested in the 
project are not listed criteria.  While they may help a claim, a claim can succeed with 
little financial investment and where that investment is primarily made in a country 
other than the Respondent country.187  
 Meanwhile, the Mitchell Tribunal emphased the importance of “contribution 
to the economic development of the host state.”188 In support, the Tribunal pointed to 
Fedax, “which involved promissory notes issued by the Republic of Venezuela” and 
CSOB, which involved a loan.189  In CSOB, the Tribunal found that “[u]nder certain 
circumstances a loan may contribute substantially to a State’s economic 
development.”190 As well, “the contribution,” though “essential” does not have to be 
“sizeable or successful.”191  And, “of course, ICSID tribunals do not have to evaluate 
the real contribution of the operation in question.  It suffices for the operation to 
                                                 
185 Id. (referring to Holiday Inns S.A and others v. Morocco; Amco Asia Corporation and others v. 
Republic of Indonesia; Salini v. Moroco (foot note 7)). 
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187 See SGS v. Pakistan, Fedax, and CSOB for examples of tribunals’ flexible interpretations of 
“investment.” 
188 Mitchell at para. 27. 
189 Id. at para. 30. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at para. 33. 
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contribute in one way or another to the economic development of the host State, and 
this concept of economic development is, in any event, extremely broad but also 
variable depending on the case.”192   
If the Tribunal relied on the Washington Convention criteria in Mihaly 1, they 
would find that an “investment” had occurred.  Analyzing this through the relevant 
criteria: (1) Substantial Investment.  Substantial investment occurred over the course 
of the negotiations.  Mihaly 1’s expert calculated that two to four percent of its 
expenditures occurred in the planning phase.193  As well, “it is standard practice 
accepted by host governments, lenders and other equity investment to include the 
sponsors’ development expenditures in the investment cost.”194 Even if the monetary 
expenditure did not suffice, the Mitchell Tribunal highlights many cases that consider 
“work” and/or “know-how” to constitute “investment.”  And the know-how 
appropriated by the government from Mihaly 1 certainly fits the Mitchell description.   
(2) Duration. The one to two years that Mihaly 1 spent developing the plans 
for a power plant should suffice in terms of duration, especially considering their 
long-term goals.  As the Mitchell Tribunal said, “ICSID tribunals do not have to 
evaluate the real contribution of the operation in question.”195   
(3) Risk. Investments, particularly in the Buy-Operate-Transfer (“BOT”) 
format, present a significant risk to the investor, as the initial investor bears the risk of 
natural disasters, war, etc., which would increase the project’s costs.   
(4) Contribution to economic development of host state.  According to 
Mitchell, economic development is a broad concept.  Mihaly 1 doesn’t even require a 
broad reading of economic development.  Economic development occurred prima 
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193 Mihaly at para. 34.  
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195 Mitchell, supra note X. 
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facie in Mihaly 1—as the entire case surrounds the host State’s enjoyment of an 
enrichment. Sri Lanka utilizing Mihaly 1’s plans clearly contributed to its economic 
development, even if the contribution by Mihaly 1 was involuntary.  And of course, 
Mihaly 1’s initial intent was to do the same.  It is precisely this actual contribution to 
Sri Lanka’s economic development coupled with Mihaly 1’s know-how investment 
that separates Mihaly from Mihaly 1.  In Mihaly there is no economic contribution and 
no contract, and in Mihaly 1, there is a provable and substantial contribution.   
Fulfilling the Washington Convention requirements are vital for Mihaly 1’s 
case, even if the BIT covered “intellectual property” or business “interests.” Although 
some tribunals think that BIT definitions of investment preempt the Washington 
Convention, the Tribunal in Mihaly found that since a contract had not been entered 
into, BIT language did not apply.  Thus, even if the Mihaly 1 plans were considered 
intellectual property, they would be precluded unless Mihaly 1 could find somewhere 
else to hang their cause of action hat (i.e. “customary or conventional” international 
law).  
So, Mihaly 1 will first have to prove that its pre-contractual expenses meet the 
four “customary law” or Washington Convention components for “investment.”  
Then, the Tribunal might want to ensure that the “investment” would be an 
“investment” as defined under the BIT. In this case, the Claimant would have to prove 
that their “investment” could be placed within one of the listed categories defining 
“investment” in the BIT.  
b) BIT Definitions of Investment 
 
BITs often offer more generous definitions of “investment.”  In CSOB v. 
Slovakia, for example, the Tribunal found that under the BIT Art. 1(1)(c) 
“investment” is “any asset” including: “monetary receivables or claims to any 
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performance related to an investment.”196 The Tribunal held that the BIT terms were 
broad enough to encompass loans, but that not “any loan” meets the requirement of an 
investment under the Washington Convention.197 Additionally, in Helman, the 
Tribunal finds that broad language such as  “asset,” “any other rights,” “any similar 
rights,” “pursuant to a contract having an economic value,”198 “shows that Article 1 
[of the Egypt BIT] encompass [sic] wide concepts.”199  Hence, if the Mihaly 1 
Tribunal believed that lex specialis [BIT rules] governed, the Claimant would have an 
easier case to make.  
The BIT in SGS v. Pakistan also boasted a broad definition of investment. 
“Investment is defined so as to….include every kind of asset and particularly:….(c) 
claims to money or to any performance having economic value…as well as all other 
rights given by law, by contract, or by decision of the authority in accordance with the 
law.”200 ”This “non-exhaustive” definition was, according to the Tribunal, 
“sufficiently broad to encompass the PSI agreement.” 201 As well, relying on lex 
specialis, the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan found for the Claimant, even though SGS 
invested very little in Pakistan itself.202    
 Likewise, in dicta the PSEG Global v. Turkey AWARD held that “[a]n 
investment can take many forms before actually reaching the construction stage, 
including more notably the cost of negotiations and other preparatory work leading to 
the materialization of the Project, even in connection with Pre-investment 
                                                 
196 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS v Slovakia, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
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expenditures.”203 And while the Tribunal was referring primarily to its own case, 
wherein a valid contract was signed, and it distinguished itself from Mihaly, it pointed 
out that, “in Mihaly the decision did in fact consider that it might well be the case in 
other investments that the moneys spent of expenses incurred in their preparation can 
be swept under the umbrella of such investment.”204 
In PSEG, the Tribunal gave jurisdiction even though no work had been done.  
And probably correctly, given the BIT’s definition of investment: 
“Investment” means every kind of asset in the territory of one Party 
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals or companies 
of the other Party, including assets, equity, debt, claims and service 
and investment contracts; and includes: (i) tangible and intangible 
property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and pledges; (ii) a 
company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or other 
interests in the assets thereof; iii) a claim to money or claim to 
performance having economic value and associated with the 
investment; (iv) intellectual property and industrial property rights, 
including rights with respect to copyrights, patents, trademark, trade 
names, industrial designs, trade secrets and know-how and goodwill; 
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and 
permits pursuant to law; and; (vi) reinvestment of returns, and of 
principal and interest payments arising under loan agreements.205  
This is a fairly typical BIT definition of “investment.”  
The above BIT language provides a number of options for Mihaly 1.  Mihaly 
1’s plans are “intellectual property,” because intellectual property includes “industrial 
designs” and “know-how.”  As well, the right to compensation where someone profits 
from your design is “a right conferred by law” in almost all countries.  Lastly, an 
                                                 
203 PSEG Global Inc and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Širketi v Turkey, Award and 
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industrial design and/or a company’s outlay, which benefited another company, could 
be considered both “interests in the assets of a company” and/or “a claim to money or 
to performance having economic value.”  These options do not apply to the original 
Mihaly because if the host country doesn’t use the designs, then there is no 
“intellectual property right,” “know-how,” nor any “assets” in a going concern.   The 
fact that the investment is used is the lynchpin to being deemed an “investment.” 
 Having found that Mihaly 1’s investment qualifies as a protected 
“investment,” both under the Washington Convention and under typical BIT 
language, I move to the other Washington Convention jurisdictional requirements.  
First, I explore requirement (iii) “that the dispute arises directly out of an 
investment,”206 and then “(ii) that the dispute was a legal one.”207 Fulfilling 
requirement (ii) necessitates analyzing the “fair and equitable treatment standard.”     
c) Washington Convention Requirements: (iii) That the 
dispute arises directly and not indirectly out of an investment. 
 
 Finding a causal connection is straightforward in the current hypothetical 
because Sri Lanka directly benefited from Mihaly 1’s investment. This dovetails with 
restrictions inherent in unjust enrichment, as unjust enrichment per se requires a 
causal connection between the Claimant’s loss and the unjustified enrichment. This 
element will complicate cases where a third party benefits from the investment, as 
“Mihaly 2” will explore. 
d) Washington Convention Requirements: (ii) That the dispute 
was a legal one: Fair and Equitable Treatment. 
 
A violation of local law or even a general principle of law is not enough to get 
jurisdiction under ICSID.  The Respondent country must violate something that the 
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Tribunal understands to be contained within an article of the BIT.   Investors, then, 
must find a hook to hang their unjust enrichment claim on within the BIT.  For Mihaly 
1, a violation of the “fair and equitable treatment” standard is the simplest. 
Although tribunals’ applications of “fair and equitable treatment” could be 
depicted as a gradient, for simplicity’s sake, I am going to break it into three general 
readings: broad, moderate, and narrow.  The narrowest reading is that “the obligation 
to treat an investment fairly and equitably refers to the minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens under customary international law.”208  The moderate reading 
would be that “fair and equitable” requires “a higher standard of conduct more in 
consonance with the objective of the treaty.”209  Lastly, Tecmed reflects the broad 
standard, where the Tribunal finds that “fair and equitable” requires not violating 
investor expectations.210  
Siemens v. Argentina provides a useful survey of “fair and equitable 
treatment:” 
In their ordinary meaning, the terms “fair” and “equitable” mean 
“just”, “even-handed”, “unbiased”, and “legitimate”… It follows from 
the ordinary meaning of “fair” and “equitable” and the purpose and 
object of the Treaty [to intensify economic cooperation…and create 
favorable conditions for investments] that these terms denote treatment 
in an even-handed and just manner conducive to fostering the 
promotion and protection of foreign investment and stimulating private 
initiative.  Terms such as “promote” or “stimulate” are action words 
that indicate that it is the intention of the parties to adhere to conduct 
in accordance with such purposes.211  
                                                 
208 Siemens v Argentina, Supra note X at para 289 
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“Just” is the first word used to define the ordinary meaning of “fair and equitable 
treatment.”  “[J]ust manner” only strengthens this connection.  Unjust enrichment is 
based on the idea of “just.”  By definition, the enrichment must be unjust to qualify in 
the merits stage.  The “fair and equitable treatment” standard, if nothing else, purports 
to ensure that the host State treat the investment in a “just manner.”  Benefiting 
unjustly from the investment, then, must violate the “fair and equitable treatment” 
standard.  And if the standard is violated literally, then, there must be a legitimate 
cause of action for unjust enrichment contained within the standard.  If a definitional 
argument does not suffice, perhaps adding the argument that unjust enrichment 
violates customary international law will. 
 The Siemens Tribunal continues: 
There is no reference to international law or to a minimum standard [in 
the instant Treaty’s definition of fair and equitable].  However, in 
applying the Treaty, the Tribunal is bound to find the meaning of these 
terms under international law bearing in mind their ordinary meaning 
[just, etc.], the evolution of international law and the specific context in 
which they are used.212   
 
The Tribunal adds: 
The question whether fair and equitable treatment is or is not 
additional to the minimum treatment requirement under international 
law is a question about the substantive content of fair and equitable 
treatment.  In 1927, the US-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission 
considered in the Neer case that a State has breached the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation when the conduct of the State could be 
qualified as outrageous, egregious or in bad faith or so below 
international standards that a reasonable and impartial person would 
easily recognize it as such.  This description of conduct in breach of 
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the fair and equitable treatment standard has been considered as the 
expression of customary international law at that time.  For the 
Tribunal the question is whether, at the time the treaty was concluded, 
customary international law had evolved to a higher standard of 
treatment.213  
The Tribunal describes a narrow reading in Genin where, “[a]n international 
minimum standard…could only be breached by “a willful neglect of duty, an 
insufficiency of action falling far below international standards, or even subjective 
bad faith.”214 
 Later tribunals adopted a more “modern” reading, or as I called it, moderate 
reading.  “To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the 
outrageous or the egregious.  In particular, a State may treat foreign investment 
unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith.”215  
Recent interpretations go even further, moving to the broad interpretation. For 
example, according to Waste Management II: 
The minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is 
infringed by conduct attributable to the state and harmful to the 
claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust, or 
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional 
or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an 
outcome which offends judicial propriety, --as might be the case with a 
manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete 
lack of transparency and candour in the administrative process.   In 
applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of 
representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied 
on by the claimant.216 
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Tecmed reflects this new standard, describing “just and equitable treatment” as 
requiring, “[t]reatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment.”217 
Mihaly 1’s unjust enrichment claim should fit into the moderate and broad 
“fair and equitable treatment” standards.  The narrow standard, based on customary 
international law from the 1920s, will be a more difficult case.    
Beginning with the easiest is well, easier. Under the “investor’s 
expectations”218 standard, “fair and equitable treatment” becomes a catchall clause 
within the BIT.  This interpretation allows broad judicial discretion, as investor 
expectations are myriad and subjective.  Thus, an unjust enrichment claim fits 
effortlessly.  Mihaly 1’s expectations that their project plans not be exploited by Sri 
Lanka without compensation would place unjust enrichment within the ambit of “fair 
and equitable” standard.   Also, as nearly every country allows some type of cause of 
action to prevent unjust enrichment, Mihaly 1 could surely point to their expectations 
that local laws prohibiting unjust enrichment be followed, and consequently that 
Mihaly 1 had the BIT supported right to expect that Sri Lanka not be enriched at its 
expense.  Couple this with a definitional argument about “just” standards and “unjust” 
enrichment, and Mihaly 1 has a solid claim.  
Over and above the proceeding arguments, the moderate “modern customary 
law”219 standard requires demonstrating that preventing unjust enrichment is 
customary international law.  Here, bringing up instances where the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, and current ICSID cases employ unjust enrichment is key.  For example, 
highlighting tribunals’ unjust enrichment explorations and addressing the ambiguities 
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tribunals like Enron220 and CME221 rely on to avoid determining unjust enrichment’s 
applicability in ICSID is a good starting place.  Mihaly 1 can then easily point to ADC 
v. Hungary as an example of a tribunal using unjust enrichment in ICSID—both by 
awarding restitution and in its unspoken reliance on unjust enrichment.  Lastly, 
Mihaly 1 Claimants could point to the options granted by Chorzów, so often cited as 
customary international law, as grounds for accepting a claim of unjust enrichment 
under a BIT.  Once the Court accepts that preventing unjust enrichment is required 
under customary international law, Mihaly 1 can move on to proving that unjust 
enrichment in fact occurred.  
Mihaly 1 stumbles under the narrow “bad faith” reading of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard.  Here, Mihaly 1 would have to show that there was bad 
faith on the part of Sri Lanka.  For example, that Sri Lanka had intentionally 
sabotaged the contract so that they wouldn’t have to share in the power plant profits.  
This, however, would be a breach of good faith, and might bar an unjust enrichment 
claim, as any other available cause of action preempts unjust enrichment.  Conversely, 
if Sri Lanka had no intention of creating the plant, or a new government came in and 
then decided to use the plans a few years later, Mihaly 1 would most likely fail to get 
jurisdiction under the narrow “fair and equitable treatment” standard.  
Assuming that the Tribunal applied the moderate or broad interpretation of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard, Mihaly 1 has succeeded in getting jurisdiction 
as: (1) the initial outlay for the power plant design was an investment under the 
Washington Convention customary standards and the BIT language; (2) there was a 
dispute (3) arising directly from the investment (Sri Lanka’s enrichment resulted from 
their utilizing Mihaly 1’s plans); and (4) the dispute was legal, as Mihaly 1 was able 
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The merits would have been explored during the jurisdiction phase, to show 
that the “fair and equitable treatment” standard was violated by unjust enrichment. 
Here Mihaly 1 would just be careful to provide evidence of what the other person had 
gained and NOT what it had lost.  Mihaly 1’s loss would be relevant only insofar as it 
was directly connected to Sri Lanka’s gain.  Mihaly 1 must prove: 
An enrichment of one party to the detriment of the other, and both 
must arise as a consequence of the same act or event.  There must be 
no justification for the enrichment and no contractual or other remedy 
available to the injured party whereby he might seek compensation 
from the party enriched.222  
 
In the instant case, Mihaly 1 can show that Sri Lanka, by building the power 
plant designed by Mihaly 1, was enriched, as Sri Lanka both did not have to pay for 
the power plant design and is now benefiting from more power— and that they would 
not have built the power plant were it not for expectations of gain.  Mihaly 1 can then 
show that they created the designs, which were appropriated without compensation—
and thus suffered a loss.  They do not need to show that the loss was sizeable nor 
comparable to the remedy they request, as they are employing a gains-based remedy.   
Mihaly 1 will then demonstrate that there was no justification for the enrichment 
(fraud on their part, state of necessity, or some other legal defense or reason given by 
Sri Lanka). Lastly, Mihaly 1 will show that no other remedy is available.  They can 
accomplish this by pointing to the fact that no contract exists—therefore they are not 
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undermining a contract’s integrity.  They might have to distinguish the case from 
expropriation, and might do so on the attenuated nature of claiming an expropriation 
of purely (unpatented) intellectual property, rather than a contract or physical asset, 
the majority of which was created in an unrelated country.    
 The merits will directly impact jurisdiction, as proving a violation of the “fair 
and equitable treatment” standard requires proving that an unjust enrichment, as 
defined by international law standards, occurred.   Since the case is argued in terms of 
gain, the remedy must also reflect the underlying justification for the decision, 
defendant’s unjust gain.   
3. Remedy 
 
Here is the real advantage of an unjust enrichment case in an intellectual 
property context.   Often, gains from intellectual property far exceed their initial 
outlay—particularly in things like know-how.  A remedy based on the other party’s 
gain, then, is ideal for the claimant. Some scholars and the U.S. government see 
restitution of the defendant’s gain as the best way to award remedies in intellectual 
property (“IP”) disputes.  The U.S. Trade Secret Act mandates restitution for a 
number of IP violations. 223    As well, James W. Hill argues that trade secret law 
should be based on unjust enrichment.  He argues that damages don’t suffice, because 
of the difficulty faced in approximating the claimant’s loss and because the claimant 
often suffers little loss relative to the defendant’s undeserved gain.224   
Restitution provides a range of options, sensitive to the facts of the case and 
judicial discretion.  For example, in Mihaly 1, the Tribunal could award Mihaly 1 a 
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percentage of the profits from Sri Lankan power plant.  This percentage might 
correspond to the value of the plans relative to the power plant’s total value, including 
future profits.225 (This would reflect the ADC v. Hungary award, less the amount 
awarded for dividends and the unpaid management contract fees.) I would 
recommend that the Tribunal limit the award to the percentage of real profits, keeping 
in mind that Mihaly 1 did not expend anything in the building of the plant and that Sri 
Lanka did, and that future profits may be speculative.  In Daniel Friedmann’s 
analysis, when a defendant’s contribution entails a loss or expenditure while 
constituting a major element that led to the benefit, the defendant’s expenditures 
should be considered.226 Awarding only a percentage of profits recognizes 
Defendant’s expenditures, as Defendant’s costs would be covered before profits are 
awarded.  Even awarding all profits is better for a Defendant than awarding the entire 
value of the investment.  
Awarding a percentage of profits is both consistent with the restitution award 
in ADC, and it addresses incentives for countries to develop, while minimizing waste. 
Awarding the entire profit has precedents both in Snepp and perhaps in Question II of 
Chorzów.227 In Snepp, a CIA agent published a book without getting permission from 
the CIA.  He had to disgorge all profits from the book, even though he had 
contributed much of the work. Friedmann reminds us: 
[T]here is a venerable line of equity cases which allowed recovery of 
profits for breach of fiduciary duty even where the defendant acted 
innocently and was unaware of the fact that his conduct is wrongful. 
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Once the defendant’s conduct was characterized as breach of fiduciary 
duty his good faith as well as his contribution were often disregarded 
and he was held liable to hand over all his profits, despite the fact that 
these were mostly the result of his efforts and skill.228 
But, he goes on to explore recent cases such as Boardman v. Phipps229, which 
mitigate earlier awards of all profits.   Friedmann concludes that there are four options 
for unjust enrichment awards: 
1) The plaintiff will receive all profits, subject only to a deduction of 
the defendant’s investment in money or property.230 Such a result 
was often reached in cases of breach of fiduciary duty. 
2) The same result as under (1) except that the defendant will also be 
remunerated for his skill, ingenuity, risks undertaken and labor 
(quantum meruit). He will similarly be paid for the use of any other 
resources that he invested.231 
3) The profits will be divided between the plaintiff and the defendant 
in accordance with their relative contribution. This is a common 
solution in the “mixed fund” situation (monies of both parties were 
used in a successful venture). It is however submitted that such a 
result might be warranted in appropriate circumstances where the 
defendant’s contribution was by way of labor, ingenuity, risk 
undertaken and skill. 
4) The plaintiff will receive the objective value of that which was 
taken from him. Profits in excess of this amount will remain in the 
hands of the defendant. Such a result is the opposite of that reached 
under (1).232 
                                                 
228 Friedman, supra note 270, at 12, (citing Keech v Sanford (1728) 25 ER 223; Regal (Hastings) Ltd. 
v. Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378 (H.L.); Lac Mineral v International Corona Resources Services (1989) 
61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, noted [1990] L.M.C.Q. 4 (Davies) 460 (Birks). Cf. Also Meinhard v. Salomon 249 
N.Y. 458 (1928).) 
229 Boardman v. Phelps, 2 A.C. 46(H.L.)(1967). 
230 Where, however, the investment of the defendant was illegal or immoral (e.g., payment of bribe to a 
third party) it is conceivable that it will not be deducted from the plaintiff’s claim. 
231 A possible measure of the defendant’s entitlement is the income which he would have derived from 
his work and resources in an alternative business or occupation. 
232 Friedmann, supra note 270, at 13.   
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The option granted in the award might depend on the defendant’s innocence.  
According to Freidmann: 
The Restatement Restitution (2d) Council draft No. 1 §10 adopts a 
very liberal approach towards the mistaken improver subject only to 
the provision that the remedy given to the improver will not unduly 
prejudice the owner. This approach is however confined to the 
mistaken improver. The lot of the conscious wrongdoer is apparently 
much harsher. His whole investment is forfeited. Thus, suppose that D 
enters P’s land, removes timber, causes it to be cut, hauled and sawn, 
thus producing lumber that is much more valuable than the standing 
timber. If D was a conscious trespasser then under the Restatement’s 
Council draft he has no claim for the benefit officiously conferred on 
P. 233 
Thus, the award granted Mihaly 1 should vary depending upon Sri Lanka’s innocence 
and Sri Lanka’s contribution.  
Suppose that the design created by Mihaly 1 was worth $1,000,000 and that 
the power plant cost $399 million to build and now produces an annual profit of $5 
million.   Thus, $1 million of what Sri Lanka possesses belongs to Mihaly 1.   
Under (1), Mihaly 1 will receive all the profits including the estimated future 
profits based on Snepp and other early common law decisions.  This option might 
occur where Sri Lanka intentially avoided entering the contract in order to costlessly 
exploit Mihaly 1’s plans.  It is not, however, a good option, as it provides a windfall 
to the plaintiff.  As well, under this option, unjust enrichment as understood by Birks 
and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal would not apply, as there is a breach of good faith, 
which allows for an alternative cause of action—making it a wrongful, rather than 
unjust enrichment. 
                                                 
233 Id. at 17. 
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Using (2), Mihaly 1 receives the $5 million dollars and future profits, and will 
reimburse Sri Lanka for its expenses in building the power plant.  Sri Lanka will thus 
get its $399 million back, but not share in any of the profits.  This is a better option in 
the case of an intentional appropration of Mihaly 1’s designs.  
In (3), Mihaly 1 and Sri Lanka split the profits, in proportion with their 
investments.  Thus, Mihaly 1 would get 1/400 of the profits.  The Tribunal might find, 
however, that Mihaly’s design was worth more than its market value (considering the 
difficulty in valuing intellectual property) and thus award a larger percentage of the 
profits.   This solution seems fair to both parties, and appears the least punitive.   
Under (4), which is most favorable to Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka retains the $5 
million in annual profits after refunding the FMV of  Mihaly 1’s design ($1,000,000).  
This solution might be desireable where Sri Lanka was unaware that the design was 
not theirs to keep.  An example might be where a new government comes in and 
innocently uses the design.   
I think that Friedmann accurately summarizes the matrix a court should employ: 
If the defendant was a conscious wrongdoer and his contribution 
consisted mainly of his own skill and labor, the court may deny him any 
compensation. However, in extreme cases in which his skill and labor 
created most of the benefit, some allowance might be made. The 
defendant’s case is even stronger where he made an actual expenditure 
that contributed to the benefit. Allowance should be made for such 
contribution even in the case of conscious wrongdoer, though the court 
should have discretion to allow it only in part.234 
 
Understanding the incentives remedies create is important. Firstly, it is preferable 
that the country exploits the plans, as it capitalizes on labor done, and prevents a 
                                                 
I. 234FRIEDMANN, SUPRA NOTE 270, AT 20.   
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deadweight loss.  Assuming a percentage of profits are paid out through restitution, 
the situation is beneficial to both country and investor.  Indeed, as Mihaly shows, the 
investor’s costs are sunk unless Sri Lanka builds the plant.  The award then should 
encourage building by limiting the amount of restitution to a proportional interest, but 
not cut so finely as to dissuade investors from pre-contractual expenses, or encourage 
countries to avoid signing contracts. There is a danger, if tribunals give awards that 
are too low, of creating incentives for countries to refuse to enter contracts, and then 
try the product out, getting the work for free, and paying only if the project 
succeeds.235   This point is moot, however, if the country lacks the funds to develop 
the project. 
C.  OTHER HYPOTHETICALS: FINER POINTS 
 
Having explored the most straightforward case, I move on to consider 
complicating factors.  In the second hypothetical “Mihaly 2,” I assume the same facts, 
except that a third party, not Sri Lanka, built the power plant.  Here I explore four 
potential third party beneficiary scenarios: 
a. The third party paid a large sum to Sri Lanka and knew that the plans 
were Mihaly 2’s. 
b. The third party paid a large sum to Sri Lanka and didn’t know that the 
plans were Mihaly 2’s. 
                                                 
235 See Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 449, 472 (1992)  ("[I]n the intellectual property setting, giving creators restitutionary 
rights tends to encourage consensual markets” In other words, the availability of a restitutionary 
remedy may encourage persons to, for example, make licensing agreements with trade-secret owners, 
instead of the remedy serving as a substitute for such market transactions. In fact, in intellectual 
property, the restitution of benefits conferred may be regarded as a "more fundamental" right than the 
liability for harms done to a create. See also Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (Cal. 1953) 
("Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on the apparent intention of the parties to 
undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created by law for 
reasons of justice.") 
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c. The third party got the plans for free and knew that the plans were 
Mihaly 2’s. 
d. The third party got benefits for free and didn’t know that the plans 
were Mihaly 2’s. 
In scenarios “a” and “b” a claim for unjust enrichment should prevail against Sri 
Lanka, for the amount Sri Lanka received for the plans.236  Here the seller (Sri Lanka) 
benefited directly from Mihaly 2’s plans.  The claim would parallel Mihaly 1 exactly, 
and perhaps even facilitate award calculations.  If, however, the buyer profited 
exponentially after purchasing the plans, it is unlikely that Mihaly 2 would be able to 
recover any of the buyer’s profits.  Unjust enrichment claims against third party 
beneficiaries are rarely recognized.237 As well, the third party, where innocent, has the 
“bona fide purchase for value without notice” defense.238  Indeed, Mihaly 2 would 
struggle to find jurisdiction for such a claim, as the causal connection required under 
the Washington Convention between the dispute and the investment would be 
stretched. And, the third party would most likely not be a signatory to the BIT.  This 
problem is explored in an auxiliary manner in Saluka, where the Tribunal decided that 
an unjust enrichment claim failed because the entity directly enriched was a 
company— leaving the country only indirectly enriched from its interests in the 
company.239   Saluka may impose interesting limitations on unjust enrichment claims, 
as it could mean that future Tribunals have to decide whether claims may be levied 
against State companies, and how much interest the Respondent State must have in 
the enriched company to be considered directly enriched.    
                                                 
236 This would have precedent in ADC v. Hungary, supra Section I.   
237 See Birks, Wrongful Enrichment, supra note X.  
238 See Part I, defenses to unjust enrichment, supra note X. 
239 See Saluka, supra note X.   
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This brings us to “c.”  “C”, in this hypothetical, is a company in which the 
State has some interests.  Applying Saluka means that jurisdiction and winning on the 
merits both depend on how much interest Sri Lanka has in the company.  For 
example, a purely State-owned company resembles Mihaly 1, and would easily gain 
jurisdiction and win on the merits.  
If Sri Lanka owns a controlling interest, however, the problem is complicated.  
Now there are other shareholders who might not know of the enrichment.  A 
successful unjust enrichment claim, however, does not require that the Defendant 
know of the unjust enrichment.  In this instance, an unjust enrichment claim may 
succeed.  Even under Saluka, I think that a controlling interest should be enough to 
prove that the State was a direct beneficiary—although this may lead to problems of 
piercing the corporate veil.   
If Sri Lanka has minority interests in the company that receives the Mihaly 2 
designs and develops them, Mihaly 2 bleeds.  In this instance, Saluka precedent 
prevents an unjust enrichment claim.   I think this is a hard call, particularly given that 
unlike Saluka, recent ICSID decisions refuse to separate entitlement to share value 
from company action.  Cases like Gami240 (Mexico’s conduct impaired the value of 
its shareholdings to such an extent that it must be deemed tantamount to an 
expropriation), Enron,241 and CMS242 liken a drop in company share value to 
expropriation and allow the shareholder to recover the loss.  True, these decisions 
arise in contexts other than unjust enrichment, but still present an interesting counter-
point to Saluka.  It would be odd to say that an increase in a company’s shares, 
wherein Sri Lanka receives a portion of the profits, is not an enrichment to Sri Lanka, 
                                                 
240 See GAMI Investments Inc v Mexico, Final Award, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, IIC 
109 (2004) (Nov. 15).   
241 See Enron, supra note X.   
242 See CMS supra note X 
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when other cases have awarded minority shareholders company lost profits. Perhaps, 
then Mihaly 2 could get a portion of the dividends or some of Sri Lanka’s shares in 
the beneficiary company.   Since unjust enrichment doesn’t require intent, the same 
would apply to “d.”   
 Mihaly designed the power plant specifically for Sri Lanka.  What if Mihaly 
had designed a fungible product?  Assume that “Mihaly 3” could have or did sell the 
design to another country.  The case in this instance hinges on Mihaly 3 sustaining 
some loss (assuming we use the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal requirements). While not 
all countries require a corresponding loss, a correlated loss serves to exclude claims 
for perfectly fungible intellectual property, like computer programs, which belong 
under the WTO regime. In the instant case, it would be up to judicial discretion as to 
whether Mihaly 3 sustained a loss, either because it didn’t find a replacement buyer or 
because there were losses incurred in finding a new client.   
 Should the fact that “Mihaly 4” patented their dam design influence the 
outcome?  Using a patent without permission violates property laws, so the Claimant 
might not even need an unjust enrichment cause of action.  Rather Mihaly 4 might sue 
under expropriation. Since another cause of action is available, under the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal standards, the Claimants would be barred from bringing an unjust 
enrichment claim.  As well, using intellectual property, in isolation, might not 
constitute expropriation.  Regardless, they could ask for the award to be based on 
unjust enrichment—relying on ADC and Chorzów.   
 A subtler problem arises during negotiations.  At what point is the information 
gleaned from an extended negotiation considered unjust enrichment to the State if the 
State later capitalizes on the information without entering into a contract?  States will 
frequently use negotiations to gratuitously derive the necessary know-how and 
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intellectual legwork for a new project.  Intellectual property regulations do not protect 
trade secrets and know-how unless there is a confidentiality agreement.  This 
hypothetical then would hinge on the existence of a confidentiality agreement 
between the State and the company, and the extent to which the company could show 
that the State’s project relied on their ideas.  These would pose substantial, but not 
insurmountable barriers to bringing an unjust enrichment claim.  The high barriers 
should serve to prevent frivolous suits, and maintain the space for independent 
invention.  Allowing these claims, however, will prevent blatant information mining 
and preserve good faith and openness in negotiations.     
Another area requiring exploration is that of timing.  The ad hoc committee in 
Amco says that res judicata limitations do not apply to unjust enrichment actions.243 
Thus, if Mihaly failed under the 2006 claim, they could sue a few years later under 
unjust enrichment, once Sri Lanka developed the power plant based on Mihaly 




                                                 
243 ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1 (Resubmitted Case: Award) Amco Asia Corporation (Claimant), Pan 
American Development Limited (Claimant), PT Amco Indonesia (Claimant) v Republic of Indonesia 
(Defendant) ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 1988 WL 1103904 (APPAWD) at para. 156.Amco’s third 
cause of action was unjust enrichment, specifically that “Indonesia would be unjustly enriched if 
permitted to retain both the benefits of Amco's investment and the earnings which Amco could have 
obtained from such investment. The Tribunal made no explicit determination regarding whether ICSID 
tribunals considered unjust enrichment a cause of action, opting to show that Indonesia had not been 
directly enriched.  AMCO’s resubmitted case, however, opens an entirely new avenue.  “The Tribunal 
here refers also to Indonesia's contention at paragraph 34 of its Observations on the Jurisdiction of the 
New Tribunal. Indonesia there contends that no unjust enrichment claim may be advanced by AMCO 
because this would create »a seemingly new argument to evade the legal force of res judicata«. But 
unjust enrichment was never the subject matter of a finding by the first Tribunal, as although the issue 
had been advanced before that body, it reached its pertinent findings on other grounds. Even if the 
present Tribunal had found that the statement of the ad hoc Committee on the lawfulness of the licence 
revocation was res judicata, the claim of unjust enrichment could still be advanced in the present 
proceedings.” This raises a number of issues.  For instance, tribunals must explore unjust enrichment 
claims and dismiss them with valid justifications, or risk retrying cases.  If unjust enrichment escapes 
res judicata, and is considered a valid cause of action, then countries risk retrial or lengthened trials, 
and claimants should be exploiting this opportunity.  
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Increasing recognition of intellectual property’s value will prompt more 
claims that could and probably should employ unjust enrichment.  Avoiding unjust 
enrichment may become increasingly problematic, as tribunals scramble to find 
substitute rhetoric for a concept easily identified as unjust enrichment.  This is not to 
say that unjust enrichment should be employed liberally.  Equitable remedies require 
rigid parameters to protect the integrity of legal concepts and contracts, and prevent 
the misuse that current ICSID pleadings demonstrate.   
In the end we should start getting comfortable with unjust enrichment. It will 
reemerge in international investment disputes soon, and better that it have universally 
applicable tenets when it does so.  Indeed, ADC v. Hungary has already opened the 
door.  As Chorzow, Lena, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, recent ICSID cases, and 
scholarly treatises show, unjust enrichment is a general principle of international law, 
and has been since the early-twentieth century. And, the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, which all BIT’s contain, protects customary international law.  Thus, unjust 
enrichment is protected by the “fair and equitable treatment” standard in BITs.   As I 
show using the Mihaly hypothetical series, unjust enrichment meets ICSID 
jurisdictional thresholds, and meets a legal need inherent in increasingly prevalent 
intellectual property cases.   
In the end, there is a space for unjust enrichment in ICSID.  A silent player in 
customary international law, housed within “fair and equitable” treatment, and 
fulfilling all of the ICSID jurisdictional criteria, unjust enrichment is simply awaiting 
the right set of facts and a disciplined application.   
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